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This study examines the rationales underlying state creation in Nigeria.
Specifically, the study addresses significant political, economic, and socio-cultural issues
considered to be the rationales behind the creation of states in Nigeria. Dependency
theory was applied to determine whether state creation is: (a) a viable public policy tool
to promote much eeded good governance in a country whose ethnic groupings number
374; (b) tied to rapid economic development of a nation whose population falls mostly
below the poverty line; and (c) reduces ethnic strife and eliminates religious tensions in a
country rife with such conflicts. The study found that the continued colonial-type
government policies that has created thirty-six states out of the original three, failed to
allay minority fears of domination by the larger ethnic groupings; has failed to deliver
rapid economic development as envisioned or bring the people closer to the government;
and has failed to stem incessant demands for state creation from minority enclaves
seeking relief from majority domination. A major recommendation of the study is
replacing cal Is br more stales with calls br quality leadership that is free from corruption
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GLOSSARY
Amalgamation oF 1914 — merging of the southern and northern protectorate of Nigeria as
one country by the British Empire that claimed these territories in 1985 Berlin
conference where African territories were partitioned amongst Europeans.
Distributive Pool Account - An account that holds excise duties on oil, tobacco and
petroleum products and shared between the states and the federal government.
Ethnicity - conscious effort to employ or mobilize ethnic identity and differences to gain
advantages in competition, conflict or cooperation in various forms including voting,
community service and violence.
Ethnic Groups - groups with membership based on claims of common identity of history,
ancestry, language, race, religion, culture and territory.
Ethno-regionalisrn - regional dominant group use of linguistic, population and political
power to galvanize the other minorities within its regional sphere of influence for gains
against the other major groups.
Ethno-religion - using the dominant religion in a region as a galvanizing force for
regional unity and for political gains.
Federal Government - is the national government and first tier unit.
Hausa-Fulani — Refers to the one of the three dominant groups in Nigeria. Hausa-Fulani
make up twenty-nine percent of the Nigerian population. Hausa-Fulani occupy and
dominate the northern part of Nigeria. Their dominant religion is Islam except for some
ethnic minorities that are Christians in that area. The Hausa-Fulani fused as one unit
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through Islam, intermarriage and political alliance and have adopted Hausa as their
common language.
Ihos - One of the three major groups in Nigeria that dominates eastern Nigeria in
population, and language. The Ibos make up eighteen percent of the Nigerian population.
The Ibos are mostly Christians while a few practice the traditional religion.
Indigene-Settler Policy - British colonial policy of restricting Southern or Christian
settlers from assimilating into the Muslim North by building separate enclaves for non
indigenes.
Majorities - Ethno-regional and linguistic groups that dominate a region politically,
economically and linguistically. As with Nigeria, the Ibos, Yorubas and Hausa-Fulani
dominate the East, West and North respectively.
Marginal Minorities - In the context of the 1967 regions, groups that are kin with people
in the neighboring regions, but are minorities within the region they live where the
majorities are not kith and kin. Examples of these groups are the Delta Ibos of the Mid
West, the Ijaws of the West and East, and Yorubas of Ilorin and Kabba.
Minorities - Categories of people/groups differentiated by political identities relating to
ethnic, religion, cultural or linguistic identities. Some refer to minorities as numerically
inferior linguistic groups but there are those that insist on a historical perspective of the
origins and nature of minorities. Nigeria, as an example, did not have minorities but over
370 ethnic groups of equal standing until the British regionalized Nigeria in the 1940s
and began a process of majority and minority groups.
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Niger Delta - The groups living on the landform at the mouth of the Niger River where
the river enters the Atlantic Ocean; the Niger Delta covers 70,000km2or 7.5% of Nigeria
landmass. It consists of the present day Rivers state, Bayelsa, and Delta state. In the year
2000, the Obasano administration expanded the definition of Niger-Delta to include
Abia slate, Akwa Ibom, Cross River state, Edo state, Imo state, and Ondo state. Some 31
million people of more than 40 ethnic groups are included in the Niger-Delta. The
Petroleum produced in Nigeria come from the oil wells in the Niger Delta.
Proper Minorities — Designation to the Non-Muslim minorities of the north, especially in
the Middle-belt to distinguish them from the Muslim minorities of northern Nigeria.
Regions - are British regional governments of Nigeria in the 1940s and continued after
1960 independence, until 1967 to serve as powerful second tier governmental units with
more land, population and resource than the smaller states.
States - Second tier governmental units in Nigeria
State creation - creation of autonomous governmental entities that serve as second tier
units under a national government.
Supreme Military Council - the Army Ruling Council that makes policies and decrees
laws for the entire country during military rule in Nigeria.
Yoruba - One the three major groups that dominates the South-Western Nigeria in
population, language and political influence. The Yorubas make up 21 percent of Nigeria
population and occupy the South Western part of Nigeria. Large numbers of Yoruhas are




Slate creation in Nigeria involves the lormation of autonomous governmental
entities that serve as second tier units. The local governments are the third, while the
national government is the first. State creation policies have been enacted in Nigeria in
[967, 1976. [987, [991 and [996 for different reasons. The predominant rationales for
creating states are political, economic and cultural. These state creation rationales are
advanced in order to promote national progress (economic), good governance (political),
and nation building (socio-cultural). This dissertation explores whether the rationales of
national progress, good governance, and nation building as stated goals of state creation
have been met. A look at the national progress (economic) rationale will entail evaluating
data related to “rapid economic development,” determining whether government is
accessible to the people, and assessing federal character issues. The good governance
(political) rationale will entail a look at the issues of domination and marginalization, and
military effort at legitimization in creating states. Finally, challenges to nation building
by ethno-regionalism and religious conflicts will be explored.
En addition to exploring state creation as an agent promoting good governance,
national progress, and nation building, the study will also discuss the drawbacks of state
creation rationales and provide solutions to those drawbacks. It is from these explorations
of state creation rationales, its drawbacks and solutions that a research position would he
stated. l)ue to the fluidity and complexity of the Nigerian political terrain, a brief political
history will situate this study. Nigeria first made contacts with Europeans in the 1400s
when the Oba of Benin met with the Portuguese slave merchants in 1472.1 The slave
trade flourished for several centuries until the British Act of Parliament ended slavery in
1 807. This coincided with the Industrial Revolution and its demand for raw materials.
The British demand for palm oil (industrial raw material) meant that the ships that
formerly carried slaves from the coastal towns of Nigeria now came for palm oil.2
By 1822-26, the British ordered a survey of the Bight of Benin in its quest to
colonize the area. Having presence and asserting authority, the British Navy in 1830
seized a Spanish ship at Bonny port on allegation of trading in human cargo. The Bonny
Kingdom chief retaliated by arresting the British officers for interfering in his domestic
affairs. The British retaliated by systematically ending the sovereignty of the Boimy
Kingdom and deposing the coastal chieftaincy in the British quest in order to gain inland
access and buy palm oil from the source. Other coastal chiefs were equally dethroned or
imprisoned. When the British dethroned King Kosoko of Lagos, they colonized the
territory in 1861. The defining moment came between 1884 and 1885 when the British
claimed Nigeria as its territory/colony at the Berlin conference where decisions were
made to partition off African countries.
The north and south remained separate protectorates after 1885. To balance the
budget deficits of the northern Nigeria, the British merged the palm oil and cocoa rich
Osaro Ighodaro, “The Political Economy of Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis’ (Ph.D. diss..




south with the northern protectorate in 1 9l4. This single act marked the beginning of
what still ails Nigeria today. The problem that emerged was how to manage over 374
ethnic groups as one nation. Before the amalgamation of the southern and northern
protectorates of Nigeria, there were autonomous ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. After
amalgamation, the British realized the complexity of managing these ethnic groups as
one country. To alleviate some of the concerns of once autonomous groups arbitrarily
merged together under one umbrella called Nigeria, the British created Native Authorities
(NA) with two distinct charges: (1) to ensure greater autonomy of groups and sub-groups
in the south and (2) to reinforce domination of various groups in the north under the
Muslim overlords in Muslim and non-Muslim areas (except for areas designated as NA
which enjoyed some measure of autonomy).
After the British created regions in the East, West and North in the late 1940s, the
374 ethnic groups that were mostly autonomous now fell under the new “majority” and
“minority” classifications. The elite of the new majority (consisting of the Ibo,
Hausa/Fulani, and Yoruba) sought to unite their various subgroups (which were already
autonomous under the NA system) in an effort to push the minorities to the periphery and
cash in on the opportunities of their new positions.6The West and East formed cultural
and political movements namely Egbe Omo Oduduwa and Ibo State Union, respectively.
These ethnic unions were solely concerned with hegemonic politics of securing influence
for the majority groups and excluding the minority groups from power at the region and
Ighodaro. “Niger Delta Crisis” 85-86.
Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The Nigerian
Experience” The Journal of Modern African Studies (1998): 4.
6lbid..4-5.
4
at the center.7 ‘l’he resultant doiniiiatioii of the North by the I lausal ulani, the East by the
Ibos and the West by the Yoruba, left the minorities at the margins. The minorities sought
redress through dissent and separatist activities in the 1950s.
Managing the multiple minority problems has continued to plague Nigeria from
the colonial times to the present. Nigeria has sought variant doses of federalism, bill of
rights and secularity to deal with its multiple minority issues. Nigeria has emphasized the
creation of states and local governments as a way to remedy minority problems. Eghosa
Osaghae defined minority problems as “discrimination of various groups due to their
inferior numbers, diffusion, and historical evolution within the modern Nigeria state,
have been subjected to subordinate political, social and economic positions in the
federation and its constituent units.X The minority elites and movements have
concentrated their efforts toward resolving being discriminated against in the country’s
power sharing and resource distribution. Unfortunately, state creation has not resolved all
minority issues. The former Eastern Region Military Governor, Emeka Odumegwu
Ojukwu, summed the problem of state creation with these words:
The real problem with the state creation issue is our inability as a nation to decide
what states are really for. In an attempt to allay certain ethnic apprehensions states
were created, but somewhere along the line we have converted the whole idea
from a political into an economic concept. Here lies our confusion.9
Before independence, the issue of managing minority problems through state
creation was prominent at the 1957 constitutional conference in London. The Nigeria
Ibid., 5.
Ibid.. 4.
Rotimi Suberu. “The Struggle for States in Nigeria. l976-l990’ 4frü an AfThirs 9(1 (October
1991): 522
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1)OlitiCaI party leadership attempted to use the Constitutional Conference in London to
iron out the multiple minority issues that continue to plague Nigeria. The minority
political parties sought state creation as a way to resolve the problem of being dominated
by the major groups. The British government created the Willink Minorities Commission
and mandated her to lnd a middle ground between political party delegates squabbling
over creation of states and to determine how best to manage multiple minority problems
in Nigeria. The Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria
and the Carneroons (NCNC) were for state creation while Action Group (AG) and
Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) movement were against it.11 The issues at stake were: (1)
whether political solution of state creation resolves majority domination of minorities; (2)
whether economic development would resolve economic depression allegedly prevalent
in minority areas; and (3) whether cultural or ethno-linguistic autonomy would resolve
the multiple minority tensions. The Willink Commission decided against state creation as
the solution to multiple minority problems and instead opted for the economic
development option. The commission recommended the creation of river-basins authority
for the depressed Niger Delta area.
The problem of managing multiple minority issues did not cease after
independence from Britain in 1960. By independence, Nigeria had three regions: East,
West, and North. Regions, like states, are the second tier governmental units in a federal
system of government. With Nigeria, the three regions were dominated in the East by the




Ihos, in the West by the Yoruba, and the North l)y (lie 1 lausa—Fulani. The three regional
governmental arrangement meant that the 370 other ethnic groups would be arbitrarily
subjected to the doininatioti of the majority groups of’ Ibo, Yoruba and Ilausa-Fulani.
After becoming a republic in 1963, the new Nigerian civilian government created a fourth
region—the Mid-Western Region. The new region of the Mid-West was carved out of
the then Western Region for various political reasons.
First, the ruling coalition consisting of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and
the National Council of Nigeria and the Carneroons (NCNC) desired a new region of
influence. Second, the ruling coalition desired to diminish the influence of the Western
Yoruba on the multi ethnic minority of the Mid-West. The ruling coalition claimed their
rationale for creating the region was to allay fears of majority domination of the
minorities. Fears of domination are real as the three major ethnic groups (Ibo, Yoruba and
Hausa-Fulani) have 57.8% of the population while the other 370 ethnic groups make up
42.2% of the population.’3The ruling party not only excised the Mid-West from the West
but wanted to take control of the western region away from the Action Group party which
controlled the west.
The push for creation of the Midwest and the Census count of 1962 were the
lighting rod of the 1962 crisis. The East and West were against the 1962 Census which
they felt the North rigged and therefore was inaccurate. The West reacted violently to the
inaccuracies of the 1962 Census. A resulting riot in the West was met with the federal
2 United States Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Country Profile: Nigeria
(Washington, D.C., 2006), 2
LI Mustapha R. Abdul. “Ethnic Structure. Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in
Nigeria.” Center fir Research on Inequality. Human Security and Ethnicity 18 (May 2005): 4
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government response ol declaring a state of emergency and breaking up the opposing
AG party. The ruling coalition appointed a federal administrator from a faction of the
AG that conceded to the creation of the Midwest.
‘Flie 1962 Census was cancelled atid a new Census was instituted in 1963. The
1963 Census was equally controversial as inflation of figures and maipractices were
alleged.5Disagreement over the Censuses of 1962 and 1963, and fragmentation of the
opposition by the ruling coalition were all recipes for the ensuing riots and political
hooliganism in the west. The crisis of the general election of 1964 was bigger than the
1962 crisis. The ruling parties used all imaginable intimidation tactics to secure victory in
their regions of influence.’6The 1965 Western election was marked by rigging and
irregularities, and indiscriminate killings of innocent civilians by party thugs. The non
Muslim minorities of the Middle Belt (Tiv) rioted for three years (1962-1965) over the
NPC rule of the North without minority In response to the turmoil in the
country, the military rebelled in January 1966 and took over the government.
According to Smith, the new military Head of State, General Aguiyi Ironsi’s
institution of centralization (Unitarianism) which seized all powers from the regions and
empowered only the center, was seen by northerners as an Ibo attempt at dominating the
country. The counter coup of July 1966 was an effort to retaliate the killing of northern
leadership in the January coup and to stop the Ibo effort towards dominating the country.
4 Rotimi Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, (Washington D.C: United States
Institute of Peace, 2001), 84.
5 Abubakar Atofarati, “The Nigeria Civil War, Causes, Strategies. and Lessons Learnt” (US




The lhos threatened secession over killings of the Iho civilians in the north and the
assassination of Ibo head of state General Ironsi. General Yakubu Gowon who took over
the government countered by declaring a state of emergency and unilaterally divided the
country into twelve states on May 27, 1967.8 ‘l’his single act of dividing up regions into
states plunged the country into civil war from 1967 to 1970.
Yet, creating the twelve states out of the four regions ended up uniting the country
by weakening the regions and enabling the center to manage them. Creating 12 states out
of the 4 regions was a way to weaken the Northern Hausa-Fulani domination of the
northern minorities, the Eastern Ibo domination of her minorities, and the Western
Yoruba domination of minorities. General Gowon succeeded in creating 12 states with
ethnic minorities support. The southern minorities reciprocated for the creation of their
new states by supporting the war effort against Eastern Ibos’ bid for secession. The
creation of 12 states may have helped diffuse the Ibo strength in their secessionist bid but
“let the genie out of the bottle” as the agitation for states became widespread amongst all
ethnic minorities. Managing ethnic minority issues in Nigeria centered on creation of
states as a way to appease one minority group or the other.
According to Rotimi Suberu, by the end of the war in 1970, the federal
government promulgated a decree stating that the distributive criteria of equality of state
and population would receive 50 percent of funds from federal Distributive Pool
Allocation (DPA) to states.19 This new law was trying to address the increased influence
of oil revenue on the Nigerian economy and how the minority Delta and Mid-West states
‘ Brian Smith. Federa1-State Relations in Nigeria.” African Affiuirs. (19511:357
‘ Suberu, “The Struggle,” 500.
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were getting almost twice the revenue allocation that the East and West were getting. The
new law of equal sharing of 50 percent of federal revenue among states consequently
created another problem as emphasis was put on statehood as the basis for receiving
Federal revenue allocation. Suberu, indicted the prominence given to states in revenue
distribution formula as driving the demand for states.20
People now saw statehood as a way to bring one service or the other to their area.
This attitude crystallized the “rapid economic” rationale for those seeking states. The
1976 Justice Irikefe Commission on state creation observed that the basic motivation in
the demand For more states was the desire For rapid economic development. The Irikefe
Commission was also of the view that while the created states were not individually
economically viable, the country as a whole constituted a single economic unitH This in
effect implied that those creating the states knew that the states they were creating were
not viable but yet pushed for more states so long as the country was viable and the states
would be taken care of by the central government. The center created 19 states in 1976
and by 1979 instituted the “federal character principle.” The federal character of 1979
and equality of states principle of 1970 strengthened and encouraged the idea of using
statehood to receive large amounts of federal revenue.
The “rapid economic” rationale for demanding states has not brought real
economic development to those states. If real economic development was the emphasis,
discussion and policy should have centered on what happens to Nigeria’s 32 solid
minerals (16 of which are highly viable). Oil contributes 25 percent of Nigeria gross
Ibid.. 500
‘ Suheru. Ethnic Conflict,” 90.
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domestic product (GDP) and employs 6 percent of the labor force. The solid minerals, on
the other hand, had a combined capacity to provide up to 5 million jobs* Unfortunately,
people were demanding states and seeking rapid economic development which never
took place.
The 1980s and 1990s state creation exercise were characterized by cultural factors
as groups now mobilized along religion and region to seek more states while intra-state
and communal conflicts increased. According to Suberu, by 1987, General Ibrahim
Babangida’s administration created two more states; Akwa Ibom and Katstina out of the
Cross River and Kaduna states, respectively. A section of the State Creation Bureau and a
live-man Presidential Advisory Committee recommended the creation of the two states
because of the intensity and relative longevity of the two demands.23 General Babangida
quickly approved the establishment of two colleges in each of the states. This is in
accordance with the federal character scheme that guarantees a cabinet position and two
colleges to all the states.
The 1980s witnessed the worst economic downturn resulting from plummeting oil
prices. The economic hardship forced the country to accept the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) from the World Bank which mandated that Nigeria withdraw subsidies
given for education, transportation, and energy. The increasing economic downturn
created anxieties and ethno-regional and religious tensions. Such tensions were
intensified when the President signed the country into the Organization of Islamic
22 Local Sourcing of Raw Materials: Solid Minerals (Nigeria: Nigeria Investment Promotion
Commission, 2003) www.nipc-nigeria.org,
‘ Suheru. “The Struggle,” 520.
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Conference (OIC). ‘[lie ()IC is the second largest inter—governmental organization after
the United Nations and has a membership of 57 states. OIC serves as the collective voice
of the Muslim world and was established September 25, 1969.24 By 1970, OIC
established a permanent secretariat in Jeddah for their day-to-day operations. The Islamic
Conference of foreign ministers meet every year, while the heads of states and kings meet
every three years. The OIC and its personalities see to the consultative and cooperative
relations with the United Nations and other Intergovernmental Organizations to protect
vital interests of Muslims. Signing a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country into an
organization in which most member states are predominantly Muslim generates anxiety
for other Nigerians who ask if Nigeria is turning into an Islamic state. Unfortunately,
emphasis remained on state creation to alleviate some of the ethno-regional and religious
tensions. State creation continued to be the prescription for resolving those ethno-regional
and religious tensions with increasing side effects.
According to Rotimi Suberu, the spillover effect of state creation of the 1980s was
the marginalization and disintegration of groups. Groups were separated from their kin
into other states. A good example of this phenomenon was the Oron community being
placed in Akwa Thom as opposed to New Cross River state where they wished to be
left.25 Such arbitrary actions or marginalization brought the cultural rationale for state
creation to the forefront. The marginalization of groups in the 1980s continued into the
1990s. Communities were split between one or two states where they were minorities.
24 Organization of [he Islamic Conference, About OIC, (Jeddah: OIC Secretariat) www.oic
oci .orgloicnew/page/id=5 2
2 Suberu, The Struggle.” 5 I S.
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Osaghac, distinguished these minorities by stating that there are Muslim minorities and
proper minorities in northern Nigeria. Osaghae used the term “proper” minorities to
characterize non 1—lausa-Fulam speaking and non-Muslim of the Middle Belt26 The third
category is the ‘marginal’ minorities (a term coined by Ekeh) who have affiliations with
one of the majority groups but were cut off from them by the regional boundaries.27
These groups include the Yoruba of Ilorin and Kabbah province of northern Nigeria,
Western Ibos in the Mid-West of Western region, the Akoko-Edo Yoruba of the Mid
West, and the Ijaws of the Eastern and Western regions:
This marginalizatiori phenomenon led to new minority formations and as such
intensified the agitation for more states. Various ethnic groups formed political and
militant organizations to advance their ethnic nationalistic interests. A limited listing will
be enough to illustrate groups seeking states and other distributive justice in Nigeria.
From the South-West are the Afenifere (political) and Oodua People’s Congress
(militant). From the South-East are the Oha Na Eze (political) and Movement for the
realization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB-militant). The North-East and
North-Central have Northern Elders Forum (political) and AREWA People’s Congress
(militant). The South-South enlists the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP), Egbesu Youths, Ijo National Congress (all militant groups) for pushing their
26 Eghosa Osaghae, “Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria.” African Affiuirs 90 (April
1991): 240.




zones’ interests. The lVliddle 13c11 has the Middlc-i3elt Forum (political) and Middle Belt
People’s Congress (ml itant).
The quest For sell’ determination and resource control by these zonal groups is
pressurizing the Federal government into caviig into the incessant demands for states.
While zonal minority groups pressure the central government for more states, elites from
these zonal groups seek states to benefit themselves. An example is the Ekiti elite that
broke rank from their homogenous Yoruba group’s Afenifere (political movement) to
gain a state. The Abacha administration used a ‘divide and rule’ tactic to grant the Ekiti
people a slate at the expense of Yoruba which united against his regime.3°
Background of the Problem
The Willink Commission was instituted at the 1957 Nigeria constitutional
conference in London by the British government. The commission was to recommend a
solution to the bickering over state creation and multiple minority issues in Nigeria. The
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Northern People’s Congress
(NPC) political parties were for state creation while the Action Group (AG) and the
minority parties were against state creation. The Willink Report of 1958 ruled against
state creation because of its proliferation potential. The Willink Report was of the view
that splitting the regions would encourage a trend that would be hard to stop and would
not resolve the Nigerian minority problems. The report instead recommended the
institution of river-basin authorities as a way to deal with minority economic
2) Anthony 0. Agwuele, “Military Occupation, the National Question and the Rise of Ethnic
Nationalism” in Twentieth Century Niceria, Toyin Falola (ed..) (Durham. North Carolina: Carolina
Academic Press, 2002). 354.
Brennan Kraxberger “The Geography of Regime Survival: Ahacha’s Nigeria,” Afri’an Affiuir,s
(2004): 413.
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development issues. Once Nigeria became a republic in 1963, the minority pressure for a
region was the partial reason for creating the Mid-West.
When the military took over in 1966, the eastern push for secession forced the
military government of Gowon to discard the decree that allowed Nigeria to function as a
loose federation and opted to create 12 states out of the 4 regions in 1967. The military
felt that a strong region gave the East the impetus to secede and seize the oil and other
economic holdings. Weakening the regions by turning them into states could not ensure
political and economic unity. This trend of creating states and undercutting the economic
viability of regions had continued from 1967 up to 1996. Today there are a total of 36
states in Nigeria This study tries to determine if national unity, nation building and
national progress have been achieved as a result of such state creation rationales. The
four regions of 1963 and the twelve states of 1967 become a threshold of analysis of how
well state creation has fared. At the other extreme is the cultural tension of
region/religion which was advanced by those that sought states in the 1980/1990. Moving
from regions to proliferated states has failed to garner political/economic improvements
and stability for Nigeria
Statement of the Problem
The problems of governance in Nigeria started long before the country gained
independence from the British colonizers in 1960. The colonists utilized “divide and
rule” tactics in order to exploit and subjugate the natives from who were extracted cheap
labor and huge resources. Problems of governance deepened after independence as the
British instituted three major ethnic groups ((ba Yoniba and Flausa) to control a nation
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with OVCf 370 ethnic minorities. Disagreements over proper governance and treatment of
ethnic groups have led to various solutions, including coups, counter—coups, attempted
secession, administrations by military officers, and civilian governments.
The minorities’ fear of domination by the three major groups and exclusion from
much needed scarce resources was a legitimate concern that has led to demonstrations
and agitations for the creation of more states. As the number of newly-created states
increased from 3 to 4, to 12, and then to the present 36, former majorities become
disillusioned with loss of power, while former minorities soon become major groups who
dominate other smaller minorities. Various rationales have been advanced as core reasons
for the multiplicity of states in Nigeria. The rationales are political as well as economical
and cultural.
The present study examines the rationales underlying state creation in Nigeria.
Specifically, the study addresses significant questions. Is the state creation a viable public
policy tool to promote much needed good governance in Nigeria? Is it tied to rapid
economic development of a nation whose population falls mostly below the poverty line’?
Does it reduce ethnic strife and eliminate religious conflicts? How well does the creation
of additional states end regional tensions? Does it promote nation building? Writers and
groups at various points in the political spectrum debate the efficacy of state creation
rationales and for advance the convincing arguments in support of their positions. The
purpose of the present study is to review the various views in the debate and attempt to
see if goals have been met as originally intended by the initiators of the rationales.
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Research Objectives
1. To show whether state creation as envisioned in 1967 by Gowon’s military regime and
adopted by successive regimes has helped to promote good governance and rapid
economic development, reduce ethnic strife, eliminate religious conflicts, end regional
tensions, and usher in government that is closer and accountable to the people.
2. Identify some likely problems or drawbacks associated with states creation and reasons
Ior these problems.
3. Recommend solutions to address these problems.
4. Take a position as to the viability or efficacy of state creation as an important
instrument to ensure national unity, rapid economic development, and political stability
in Nigeria.
Significance of the Study
This study is significant because it is a departLire from previous studies which
concentrated on struggles for Nigeria’s states without describing rationales in details.
The study characterizes the predominant issues taking place in Nigeria in an attempt to
clarify the rationale behind the creation of states at various points in time. Attempts are
made to articulate cultural, political, and economic struggles for each period of Nigeria’s
political history as a way to generate further debate as to what rationale works and what
does not work. It is expected that future policy makers in Nigeria and other African
nations will inquire into whether creation of states is a viable option that would solve a
legitimate, emergency problem or action that should be discouraged at all costs.
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Summary of the Chapters
[his dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is the
introduction, which provides a background of state creation rationale from 1960-2000.
The introduction covers a historical/political background of state creation. Included in the
introduction is how political rationale was used for state creation in the 1960s. By the
1970s, economic rationales were used for state creation. The 1980s and 1990s rationale
for state creation were mostly based on cultural as regional and religious undertones were
visible in considering who gets states.
Chapter Iwo reviews the literature on state creation rationales, and draws from
various literatures on federalism and ethnic problems. Apart from the broad review of
federalism, this study centers mostly on African writers’ review of federalism in Nigeria.
Federalism in the Nigeria context has been using territorial prescription for resolving
minority problems.
Chapter three reviews the theoretical framework that is applied to this study.
The applicability of the Dependency theory to this research is reviewed.
Chapter four explores the methodology of the study. The study describes how the
secondary data will be used along with interviewing some of the actors of state creation
that are available. This chapter describes the instrument and summarizes the methods
used in the research.
Chapter five explores state creation by various regimes from 1960-1996. This
chapter situates the leadership styles, types of government run by various administrations
and crisis that propelled the government to create states. With the types of government is
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an exploration of how Nigeria has moved liom a “weak centered” federal government to
a strong centered federalism. Explored in this chapter is how the creation of more states
have resulted in weaker states.
Chapter six is an Analysis of Data which considers whether state creation
promotes good governance, national progress and nation building. Various data and
tables are employed in evaluating and evidencing the benefits of state creation.
Chapter seven discusses the implication of the findings by exploring the
drawbacks of state creation, solution to the problem, and recommendations regarding
state creation rationales.
Scope and Limitation of the Study
This dissertation reviews works on state creation as they relate to the political,
economic and cultural rationale for state creation. There are works solely on state
creation but most of the literature are on federalism and ethnic issues. Since state creation
is one of the prescriptions for resolving federal structural or minority issues, federalism
and minority issues are tied into this argument as they relate to state creation rationale.
The size of Nigeria and its ethnic make-up makes it difficult to dissect the country and its
problem in a single writing. The cumbersomeness and complexity of Nigeria’s problems
is a limitation on any prospective study on Nigeria. To narrow this study, an analysis of
the rationales for state creation was adapted.
Despite the effort to streamline this study, it continues to be broad as state
creation rationale includes political, economic and cultural factors. The study is limited
because of its emphasis on secondary data on state creation. Materials from the US
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I A1)rary of Congress, Nigeria white pipers on state creation, speeches by General Gowon
and Colonel Ojukwu were not readily available. The data often found were incomplete.
There were obvious problems with compilation of and storage ol’ pertinent information.
The constant changes in Nigerian currency exchange rate added to the difficulties of
compilation of economic data and as such averages were often used. The constant change
in government wreaks havoc in bureaucratic continuity as new management and staffs are
left with incomplete records. Due to the difficulties of travel in Nigeria, the study will
only interview a limited number of actors of state creation, and rely heavily on published
writings of commentators on issues related to Nigeria. Interviews with major policy




Ihis section ot study consists ol a review of the opinions ol various writers on [he
rationales for state creation in Nigeria. Although these writers have considered the issues
related to state creation in the Nigerian context, they seem to have lailed to highlight
some of the key factors and their ramifications. The present study fills the gap by
focusing on political, economic and social rationales Nigerian policy makers advanced in
their hid to carve out more states from the original three.
R.T Akinycle’s “State Creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in Retrospect” is a
political analysis of state creation in Nigeria. In his analysis, he defined ethnic group as
“a group of people who because of their physical or cultural characteristics are singled
out from others in the society which they live for differential and unequal treatment and
who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination.”2Akinyele
listed the various strategies for arresting ethnic minority problems to include:
assimilation, ethnocide, genocide, constitutional safeguards, reversal of status and
territorial solutions. He stated that state creation is the preferred solution for the Nigerian
ethnic minorities who reason that they will become the majority in the new states and free
themselves from old majority domination.’3
‘R.’r. Akinyele, “State Creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in Retrospect” 4frk’an Studies
Review 39 (September 1996): 71.
‘Ibid.. 71.
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Akinycle was of the opinion that the Willink Report rejected all requests for state
creation to discourage fragmentation of major or minor groups. He said that the Willink
commission reasoned that fragmentations and divisions would result to non-viable states.
Despite the Willink report opposition for more states, the political pressure from
minorities seeking states forced the government to create a fourth region in 1963.
Akinyele felt the Willink Report was vindicated in its assessment that creating states
would have a snowball effect. Akinyele cited the 1976, 1987, and 1991 state creations as
examples of state creation having snowball effect. Snowball effect refers to the escalation
of the demands for states by the Nigeria minorities as soon as the first state creation was
first initiated. Akinyele’s review did not cover the last state creation of 1996. Subeni
(2001) covered the 1996 state creation and highlighted why states were created despite
Akinyele’s warning of proliferation. Suberu stated that the Abacha reghne in creating six
states in 1996, acknowledged that “state creation exercise was politically and
economically disruptive but yet remains a feature of Nigerian federalisnC3Abacha
created the last six states in 1996 without quenching the thirst of Nigerians for more
states.
Writers like Suberu, did a political economic analysis of state creation.
Suberu insisted that the revenue allocation formula that gave states 50 percent of
Disthbutive Pool Account (DPA) put a premium on statehood and consequentially
‘Subeni, “Ethnic Conflict.” 103.
ahlccte(l the prolileratioii of statcs.’ En his article, “The Struggle ft)r States in Nigeria”,
Suheru pinpointed the rationale for state creation as being political in the 1960 where
minority fears of domination was to be allayed. The 1970 basic rationale was rapid
economic development’. The 1987 creation of Akwa Ibom and Katsina were iniluenced
also by the Political Bureau’s recommendation of ensuring interethnic justice and
balanced development. The only distinction is that the study covers a time frame of 1960
to 2000 while Suberu’s covers only from 1976 to 1990.
Suberu updated his state creation paper in his book Federalism and Ethnic
Conflict in Nigeria. Suberu added that although the minority groups have made progress
by having states but the three dominant groups: Ibo, 1-lausa and Yoruba have 22 of the 36
created states.5 He also alluded to the underlying rationale of creating states in 1991 and
1996 by military juntas in need of legitimacy. What he fails to adequately address is:
“what is driving the ethno-regional and religious push for states?” To accommodate for
that, the study looked at Bienen’s work: “Religion, Legitimacy, and Conflict in Nigeria.”
Bienen was of the view that Islam has functioned in cultural and political terms to create
unity in northern Nigeria. He explained that as Nigeria moved to a 12-state system from
one of four regions, to a federal republic with 19 states in 1976, it became necessary to
stress Islamic unity in the 10 northern states where two-thirds of the population is
Muslim.6Bienen categorically stated that the north had to stress Islam in order to
maintain northern unity under attack from the creation of more states. Bienen concluded
Suberu. “The Struggle,” 500.
Suberu. “Ethnic Conflict.” 109.
Henry Bienen, “Religion, Legitimacy. and Conflict in Nigeria,” Annals of the Amen can
Academy of Political and Social Science 483 (January 1986): 50.
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that Christianity, the majority religion ifl the south, has been less consequential in seeking
political and authoritative roles in Nigeria than Lslam.
This study supports Bicncn’s premise on the unifying force of Islam but goes
further to investigate the increasing role of Christianity in influencing governmental
policies relating to state creation and its complementary benefits of governmental
appointments. Bienen’s study was published in the 1980s and was not reflective of
increasing ethno—religious influence in Nigeria. Suberu’s Federalism and Ethnic Conflict
in Nigeria, filled that gap by laying out all the Christian versus Muslim struggle over
ministerial appointments, federal commissions, Sharia. and disagreement over Nigeria
joining the Organization of Islamic Conference(OIC). Suberu’s ethno-religious review
was not centered on state creation but rather on complementary issues of “federal
character.”7
A case in point is Kaduna state that was divided into Katsina and Kaduna in 1987.
Katsina in the upper north is predominantly Hausa. Kaduna is also predominantly Hausa.
The difference between the two states is that Katsina is predominantly Moslem while
Kaduna southern minorities are predominantly Christians. The religious dichotomy
influenced the state creation but the contentions over religious matters reached feverish
pitch in February and May 2000, when hundreds of people were killed over the
institution of Sharia law in Kaduna, a city with a large Christian population.8
Abdul R. Mustapha “Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in
Nigeria,” CRISE Working Paper I 8 (May 2005): 4-6.
8 Suberu, “Ethnic Conflict,” 136.
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Writers like Ibrahiin and Kazah—Tourc, Ukiwo, Horowitz. and Osaghae wrote
extensively on federal-ethnic issues. Federal -ethnic issues are issues related to state
creation since state creation is one of the prescriptions of resolving ethnic minority issues.
Ukiwo’s study on ethnicity was a review of Nnoli (1978), Ekeh (1975), and Mustapha
(2005). Nnoli’s book was the first comprehensive investigation of ethnicity in Nigeria.
Nnoli’s view of ethnicity was from the Marxist class perspective of the Dependency
theory. This perspective asserts that ethnicity developed from colonialism.
Nnoli was of the view that as the Africans were exploited and discriminated
against, ‘they directed their aggressive impulses against other colonized ‘natives’ with
whom they competed on the basis of equality. Ethnic group membership was useful for
this competition. As ethnic groups became skillful in the fight over scarce resources, the
colonizer intensified those cleavages for the colonizer’s own end.9
According to Nnoli, the colonizer intensified ethnicity by promoting separate
settlements between natives and settlers of urban centers. Nnoli also implied that the
emerging African elite dominated and exploited their groups for gains.’0His conclusion
was that prescriptions of state creation cannot resolve the ethnic problems. Ukiwo cited
Mustapha who was of the view that the Nigeria national question should take cue from
the pre-colonial state formations where indigene-settler distinction was not promoted.
Full citizenship was granted to non natives that had settled and become important actors
Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (EnugLi: Fourth Dimension Publishers. 1978), 21.
° Ibid., 22.
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in the 1x)litical economy. Instead, the colonial era promoted the native—settler dichotomy
with the resultant consequence of the dominant ethnic groups controlling the country
after independence. There is also another consequence of colonialism which Ekeh
described as “creation of two publics.” ‘I’hese two publics are the civic public and the
primordial public. 2
The civic public is regarded as alien and its funds may be pilfered. The elite that
may evade taxes and pilfer public funds often contribute generously to community
service or their primordial public. The two public attitudes still persist. What is changing
is the configuration of the elite formations where domination of groups by the majority
ethnic groups was reconfigured with the State creation of 1967. The majority minorities’
visibility increased with the 1967 state creation. The majority groups also continued to
contest for more states as states were used for fiscal allocation of oil revenues. The Delta
region minorities that produce the oil felt marginalized which resulted in conflicts
between communities and Oil companies, communities and the state, and conflicts
between communities.
Ukiwo’s review contends that decentralization through state creation and local
government has generated ethnic conflict in some parts of Nigeria. State creation may
have exacerbated ethnic conflict but the study differs with Ukiwo’s characterization of
Nigeria state creation as “decentralization.” This study rather characterizes state creation
in Nigeria as de facto centralization for its strengthening of the center and weakening of
“Ukiwo Ukoha, 10, who cites from Mustapha [dentity Boundaries. Ethnicity and National
Integration in Nigeria” and Mustapha (1998) and Mustapha “Back to the Future: Multi-ethnicity and the
State in Africa” (1999)
‘2Ukiwo Ukoha 9, who cites from PP. Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa; A
Theoretical Statement,” Coinpai-ative Studies in History and Society 17(1).
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the constituent units. The study accepts the review’s assumption that instrumentalist
literature nms[ prove the nature of horizontal inequalities among ethnic groups instead of
simply assuming that the dumb public follows the elite. The assumption is that the elite
and masses may have common interest.
Horowitz countered the class perspective in his Eth,zic Groups in Conflict
by examining ethnicity in Asia and African countries. Horowitz was of the view that
ethnic conflict more than any other factor fuels political disorder and disrupts national
fljy•3 He contends that understanding ethnic conflict and making prescriptions must be
taken seriously. He criticized the class perspective of ethnic analysis and reasoned that
economic and elite-based theories of conflict fail to mention “why others follow.” In his
analysis, he described the “wellsprings of mass motivation” as where the elite interests
are overtaken by mass ethnic concerns.’4Nigeria is an example where the lower cadre
northern military personnel pressured the senior officers for a counter coup in July of
1966. Horowitz contends that the unranked minority (marginal group) relies on how well
their elites are doing to gauge materialization of their symbolic claim. Horowitz was of
the view that ethnic conflict is more entrenched than class conflict as class conflict can be
tangibly resolved while symbolic claims are harder to quantify and address. He
concluded that “the sources of ethnic conflict reside, above all, in the struggle for relative
group worth.”
Horowitz prescribed five mechanisms to reduce ethnic conflict as follows:
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of






• Promotion of inter—ethnic cooperation (Electoral coalitions)
• Alignment based on social class and territory as opposed to ethnicity
• Reducing constituent disparities ui education and social services.
Horowitz contends that ethnicity is more entrenched than class conflict.
Horowitz’s “well spring of mass motivation” may oiler a glimpse as to why elite and
masses push for an issue of common interest. Horowitz concludes that state creation will
not resolve ethnic tensions but rather building political structures that discourage
polarization will be the solution.
lbrahirn and Kazan-Toure in “Ethno-regional Conflicts in Northern Nigeria”
summed up the ethno-regional conflict in Nigeria. Ibrahim and Kazan-Toure (2003)
categorized the Nigerian ethno-regional conflict into north-south divide, colonial, tripolar
divide (Ibo, Hausa & Yoruba), and the multipolarity of the present Nigeria.’7Ibrahim and
Kazan-Toure described the ‘tripolar divide’ as the pre/after independence era where the
three major groups dominated. The ‘multipolarity’ speaks to the new majority-minority
formations resulting from incessant state creation that is driving intra state and inter-state
conflicts in Nigeria. They asserted that the ethno-regional domination of minorities for
political/economic power is driving the tensions in Nigeria. It is this domineering quest
“ Ibid., 598.
17 Ibrahim Jibrin and Kazah-Toure bore. “Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria,” Noidic A/rican
Institute (2003): 1.
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that has resulted 111k) (lie proliferation of states. As state creation benefit the elite, more
grassroot demands are being made by the new minorities at the margin. IS
The demands by (lie minorities arc shifting from state creation to national
sovereign conferences. The national sovereign conference suggests an equal
representation of all ethnic nationalities in a meeting to discuss the nature of a democratic
federation of Nigeria. The December 1998 National Sovereign Conference in Nigeria was
a failure as civic organizations dominated the conference as opposed to ethnic
nationalities. Onwudiwe opined that the conference lacked the support of the Nigerian
political leadership and as such failed before inception.’9 The implication of the call for
national sovereign conference which entails extreme decentralization may mean the
desire for a less centralizing influence of state creation. The Niger Delta and some
Middle Belt groups are challenging the federal government to embark on a national
project. Ibrahim and Kazah-Toure go further to state that it is no longer the big three
groups that are dominating the country but rather a changing pattern of political elite
•
• • •formation occasioned by the new states: The study agrees with elite domination as
being consistent in the political history of Nigeria. The study adds that the ethno
regionalism/religion is a mobilization move by the elites of the dominant three to
rehabilitate their positions which had been denigrated by the new states.
Osaghae, in “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The
Ibid..4.
‘ Ehere Onwudiwe. “On the Sovereign National Conference,”A Journal of Opinion 27 (1999): 66
20 Jibrin and bore. “Elhno-Religious,” 4.
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Nigeria Lxperieiice”, tried to analyze the issues affecting ethnicity, and how the federal
government on the other hand is trying to manage ethnicity or minority issues. According
to Osaghae, religion, race, class, and regionalism mutually reinforce ethnicity.2’I-Ic went
further to state that the assumption of creating states, bills of rights, and secularity as the
answer to managing ethnic problems has failed for the obvious reasons. First, the military
created states out of the flawed notion that all minority problems are ethnic and historical
and as such would fade away as minorities get states. Second, the one size-fits-all
prescription of state creation (federalism), bill of rights and secularity is unreasonable.
The limitation of state creation as a means of resolving minority problems was
undermined by intense minority conflicts of 1980s and 1990s. The 1980s and l990s
witnessed minority conflicts that were neither historical nor ethnic in nature. There were
structural issues resulting from state creation; Nigeria moved from 12 states in 1967 to 36
states in 1996. The local governments increased from 301 in 1976 to 750 in 1996.22 The
state and local government were good for minorities but exacerbated minority issues as
new minorities emerged. The intensity of marginalization of groups, especially in the
Delta region resulted in the 1990 Major Gideon Orkar coup. Following that coup, the
federal government established the Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Development
Commission (OMPADEC) to deal with socio-economic issues in the oil producing areas.
Militant groups like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP) teamed with civic society groups and continued to pressure the government to
make meaningful progress in resolving minority socio-economic issues. Debt overhang.
21 Osaghae, The Nigerian Experience, I -2.
22lbid., II.
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cOliill)t lOll, patronage, mid uiieqiiil (listriblit loll ol resiirces continue to be a cancer
detracting Nigeria from resolving her socio—economic issues. Osaghae pointed out that
despite Nigeria government establishment of (OMPADEC), increase of the derivation
revenue from 1 .5 to 3 percent to the oil producing areas, and creation of autonomous
chiefdoms or communities to accommodate small minorities within a state, minority
problems still persist.23
Osaghae failed to point out that derivation was 50 percent in the 1950s and 1960s.
Derivation revenue to states with oil and other minerals remain at 13 percent. There are
those advocating that 20 percent derivation revenue will put enough resources in the
Delta areas to help with their socio economic issues. Osaghae felt that religion, race, class
and region were forces exacerbating ethnicity. What he fails to point out is that Nigerian
elites exploit religion, race, class, and other factors for selfish reasons. In order to
discourage the elites use of these factors, the central government created states and jobs
as compensations for the elites in a consociational arrangement. Consociation speaks to
the arrangement by groups in a state that may have divisions along ethnic, religious and
linguistic lines, yet manages to remain stable due to consultation between the elites in
those groups. Nigeria, India, Belgium and Netherlands are some examples of
consociational states. The working poor that make up 75 percent of the population are left
out without being given a serious consideration in distribution of resources.
Lack of proper devolution continues to make mockery of the Nigeria federalism.
Real devolution will mean delegation of exclusive powers to states and local
2 Ibid., 23
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governments, while the federal government only retains control over national activities
(defense, external affairs, currency, customs, citizenship laws and macroeconomic
development policies). A lack of constitutions of the federating units in Nigeria speak to
their being mere administrative appendages of the center. Serious devolution in Nigeria
must include either decentralization of resource control and revenue sharing or increased
derivation revenue to mineral producing states and increased revenue to states for their
cl’foii toward generating their own income.
In conclusion, the limitation of mass input can be attributed to military and
civilian administrations’ brutality in dealing with dissent. If state creation and its
complementary benefit of jobs and resource sharing through federal character have failed
to reduce ethnic tensions, other prescriptions should be looked at. More important is how
emphasis should be placed on the improvement of social and educational factors for the
well-being of the masses and emphasis should be placed on reduction of poverty.
( ‘I IAP’[l R I’E I R il
lheoretival Frame—work
Ihis study applies the l)ependeflcy and [Jnderdcvelo1)ment theories IH
examining the rationale ni state creation in Nigeria. Dependency views the world From a
historical/economic perspective. There are three characteristic emphasis ot the
dependency theory. The first emphasis is on the economic based pattern where class and
global systems are analyzed as opposed to the state and the individual. The second is on
the historical perspective where colonialism is blamed for exploitation within and
between Africans. Third emphasis involves the primary concern of dependency on the
political economy and material matters like trade relations, capital flows, and modes of
production. The dependency school represented by writers likes Paul Baran (1957),
Theotonio Dos Santos (1971), Gunder Frank (1973), Walter Rodney (1974), and Claude
Ake (1985) theorize that the exploitative nature of the core-periphery relationship of
capitalism is flawed.55 Claude Ake characterized the Nigerian state as a creation of multi
national corporation’s (MNC) capital and a servant of her interest.
The developmentlunderdevelopment school focuses on the root causes of
underdevelopment as opposed to process of development. Dependency theory
emphasized exogenous factors as a way to counter the modernists’ handicap of
focusing only on endogenous factors. Lodged in the dependency logic is the notion that
Aijaz Ahmad, “Imperialism and Progress,” in Theorie.c of Development: Mode ot Production or
l)ependencv. ecis.. Ronald [1. Chilcote and Dale L. Johnson. (America: Beverly Hills. Sage. 1983), 33.
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issues like ‘rationale br state creation’ cannot he wholly explained from internal
iniluences but also from external factors. The external impediments of colonialism and
nco-colonialism place a handicap on development of countries like Nigeria. The
indigene-settler cleavages have stunted assimilation in Nigeria and exacerbated ethnic
issues. Debts owed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank by
countries like Nigeria help to further illustrate how those global international regimes
are tools of the west for post colonial exploitation of countries like Nigeria.
Critique of Dependency
The dependency school perception that third world countries lack the capacity to
remedy their handicap in the international economic order is unidirectional. Issues of
state creation include internal problems of ethnicity, religion and region. The internal
dichotomies cannot be downplayed as they feature prominently in the political and
economic life of Nigeria. The prescription of de-linking by unaligned nations is equally
erroneous as countries like Nigeria suppress the oil-producing Delta area people and
supply oil to Shell and other multi-national corporations (MNC) at great ‘spill-over’ cost
to the environmental and health of the people.2Dependency fails to indict the state for
atrocious activities and poor economic development. Dependency was also criticized for
the economic development of global southern countries of Malaysia, Hong Kong,
Taiwan. Singapore, and South Korea (Newly Industrialized Countries) with the help of




co—operated with the multi—natk)nal corporationS (MNCs) to build a culture of production
and export of manufactured goods while building a relationship with foreign investors.4
rfhe New Dependency Theory
According to Cardoso and Enso, the new dependency tried to remedy some
shortcomings of modernization and dependency schools. New dependency incorporated
critical analysis of internal conditions as factors affecting third world development.
Cardoso, a major proponent, claims that dependency and development can coexist. He
went further to explain that Multi-National Corporation (MNC), local bourgeois and the
military state can bring about ‘dependent-associated development.’5The other
endogenous factors that lend a hand to explaining underdeveloprnent in countries like
Nigeria are leadership, political instability and emigration of skilled labor.
Dependency and new dependency are not the only perspectives that bring
insight into the proliferation of states and rationale for creating those states in Nigeria.
Dependency however pinpoints class instrumentalism of groups for personal gains as
driving the agitation for states. V/hen the state (center) and international capital are
added in the dependency explanation along with the colonial legacies, it makes
dependency an attractive tool for analyzing the rationale for state creation in Nigeria.6
Application of Dependency Theory
The colonial, pre and post-war experience in Nigeria are laden with foreign
influences. State creation was only instituted as prescription to resolve the ethnic issues
4lbid..54.
[ghodaro. “The Niger Delta Crisis.” 54.
Ibid.. 54
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etnanat lug from colonial experience. According to Ukiwo ( 2005), comprehensive review
on ethnicity covered works of authors like Nno[i (1978), Mustapha (2005), and Ekeh
(I 999). The main thrust of these writers was how ethnicity sprang from the colonial
experience. Ukiwo (2005) went further to state that ethnicity was born as a result of the
Africans’ insecurities emanating from exploitative and discriminating treatment during
the colonial era. As a result the Africans retreated to their kin during conflict, competing
or cooperating. The Nigerians were no exception as they now were more inclined to align
with their ethnic groups when competing with other groups for the limited jobs and
resources left by the colonizers. The British continued to intensify the cleavages between
the various Nigerian groups. They instituted a settlers-indigene divide in northern Nigeria
to separate the Northern Muslims from the Southern Christians. The British felt that
integration would contaminate the hierarchical Muslim caliphate indirect rule of the
north. Indirect rule was Britain’s way of using established northern caliphate rule to do
the British bidding. Indirect rule was also established in the southern regions where
traditional chieftains and walTant chiefs carried out British administrative functions.
Three issues emerged from the British effort at administrative convenience (indirect rule).
First, it intensified ethnic cleavage from the indigene-settler communities. Second, it
brought about the religious dichotomy and regionalization of religion. Thirdly, it created
elite orientated emphasis on administration where interests of ordinary people were
overlooked so long as the British got their resources and taxes. The culmination of these
factors continues to feed the ethnic issues in Nigeria.
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Aler independence, the ethnic cleavages bred by the (livi(le and rule tactics of the
British came to a head in the 1960s. The 1964 federal election and 1965 Western region
elections were marred by fraud, rigging and ethnic politics. The Ibo president refused to
declare the northern Hausa Prime Minister as winner. The two leaders sought the military
to support their positions. The intensified ethnic politics and unrest led to the January
1966 coup which was dubbed an Ibo coup. The counter coup of July 1966 was dubbed a
1-lausa coup. The 1-lausas felt that the Ibo coup plotters killed off the northern elite in an
attempt to control the country. The counter coup in July was an attempt by the northern
soldiers to retaliate for the killing of their elites. The retaliation by the northern soldiers
escalated the tension between the Northern and the Eastern regions of Nigeria.
According to Major Atofarati, British oil interests played a major role in
dissuading the north from breaking away from Nigeria.7The coup plotters succeeded in
enabling the massive killing of Ibos in the north. The Ibos retreated to the East and
threatened secession. As tension mounted, the French gave temporal support to the
Easterners while the British supported the federal side. The French and British were
motivated by their oil interests in Nigeria. As the Ibos were consolidating their
secessionist move, the federal side was plotting on foiling that secession. The federal side
struck with the state creation as a way to weaken the secessionist bid by creating states
for the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state from the Eastern region. As war broke out, the British
and the French with oil interests in Nigeria chose sides in the conflict; British supported
the federal side while French supported the Biafran side. The Federal government’s
Atofarati 1996. 6.
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al)i lily to proetlie l’rench weapons implies that the French may have equally supported
the Icdcral side to guarantee trade and oil interests regardless of which side won. The
British and French role puts oil at the center of the 1967 conllict as the French and British
oil interests had major stakes in the conflict. The economic downturn of the 1980s
exposed Nigeria again to external pressure and iniluence.
When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that Nigeria take their
loans laced with conditionality, the Nigeria military 1-lead of State, General Muhamadu
Buhari, rejected the loan. General Buhari saw the loans as damaging and resisted
accepting them. Ibrahim Ayagi (1990), former chairman of Continental Merchant Bank
of Nigeria alleged in his book that Buhari regime of December 1983-1985 was deposed
by the IMF for resisting IMF recommended Structural Adjustment conditionality.8Julius
Ihonvbere was of the same opinion and went further to state that the incoming
administration of Babangida accepted all IMF conditions rejected by the ousted
.9 . . .government of Buhari. Nigerians opposed the Babangida administration’s acceptance of
the Structural Adjustment Program that depressed the economy further. With increasing
opposition to his administration, Babangida sought creation of states as a way to allay
tension in Nigeria. Babangida created two states in 1987 and a total of 11 states by 1993.
General Abacha succeeded Babangida and created six additional states in 1996.10
According to Ighadaro, the tension in Nigeria at this period had reached critical
mass. There was opposition to the administration and a rise of widespread militancy in
8 Ibrahim Ayagi, Nigeria: The Trapped Econo’nv (Nigeria: Hienemann, 1990)
‘ Julius Ihonvbere Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment & Democracy (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers. 1994), 27
‘° Suberu. “Ethnic Conflict.” 102.
3X
the East, West, North, Middle Belt and the Delta. The government continued to protect
the interests of the oil companies and the local elite who were being rewarded by state
creation and its complementary federal character that guaranteed jobs and resources on
the basis of state. The relationship among the Nigerian elite, military leadership, and the
oil companies was such that a warped “dependent associated development” took place
and failed to bring relief to the ordinary Nigerians. Opposition was eliminated as with the
execution of the “Ogoni Eight”, prominent Ogoni people who in 1994 challenged the oil
company and the government about allocation of oil revenue that came from their back
yard. The oil companies undermined these communities and provided logistical help to
the government troops in the massacre of villages like the Odi Village. In all, the oil
companies, the government and local elites have benefited from state creation. Marginal
stability ensured by the elite of the new states and federal government allow the oil
companies to operate and share revenues with the new state elites, and federal
government.’
‘‘Ighodaro, “The Niger Delta Crisis,” 183-185.
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Research Methodology
The analysis will [ocus on the history ol government’s rationales for state creation
heginning hom 1963 and ending in 2000. This historical analysis will touch on the
hollowing rationales:
• national unity
• allaying minority fears of domination
• hringing government nearer to the people
• promoting rapid economic development
• maintaining political stability, and
• reducing ethnic and religious tensions.
This research is strictly descriptive and draws information heavily from secondary
sources namely government documents, journals, magazines, internet sites, textbooks,
newspapers, television and radio broadcasts and many other relevant secondary sources.
The reliance on secondary data was due to the difficulties encountered with
scheduling interviews with General Gowon, Colonel Ojukwu. and other policy makers.
Many important players of state creation have since died. Culmination of these various
reasons restricted the direction and focus of the data for analysis. As such the study
resorted to prior speeches and policy statement by key players, journals and books to
descriptively analyze the state creation rationales. Tables of socioeconomic conditions
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were used to reflect the disparities inciting strife amongst groups. Poverty head count
chart was used to indicate the level oF poverty despite state creation. On the national unity
issue, a table of ministerial positions was used to show the majority groups domination of
minority through control of major positions. The table of the majority minority make-up
of states indicated how the majority groups dominated the created states politically.
The research analysis was not only descriptive, but also holistic. The economic,
political and cultural rationales were used to bolster the argument against state creation
and dispute the intentions of the state creation rationales. The other studies were more
inclined to singular analysis of political or economic while these studies choose a broader
perspective to a complex problem of state creation. The study went beyond analyzing the
rationales advanced by policy makers for state creation in Nigeria. The study instead
chooses to also analyze how certain goals were achieved in a country as diverse as
Nigeria. Does Nigeria have national unity? Are minority fears of domination by larger
tribes allayed? How close is the government to the people? Does state creation promote
rapid economic development and political stability? Is there a reduction in ethnic and
religious tensions? Data was analyzed from the point of view that state creation was a bad
idea, an unsuccessful panacea, or an impossible dream. The proof is that Nigeria still has
a myriad of political, economic and cultural issues. There is rampant poverty, widespread
tribalism, and marginalization of groups. Had a different analysis been used for this study
the conclusions would be different. For example, pieces of future research are needed to
evaluate how Nigerians are satisfied or not with the creation of states. Future research
should also evaluate and rank the significance of various rationales for the creation of
states in Nigeria. Other useFul research may (lea! with how the political economic and
cultural problems in Nigeria may be solved.
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Various Regimes (1960-1996) and Itlinic Make-up of Created States
Nigeria has gone thi’otigh various geographical fCcO[IStitutioflS from I 96()
Independence to 1996. There has been fl() state creation since 1996 to the present. The
various regimes from 1960 to 1996 include: Tafawa Balewa Administration (1960—1966),
General Aguiyi Ironsi (January, 1966-July, 1966), General Yakubu Gowon (1966- 1975),
General Murtala Mohammed and General Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-1979), President
Shagari (1979- 1983), General Muhamadu Buhari (1983-1985), General B abangida
(1985-1993), and General Sanni Abacha (l993-1998).
Balewa Administration (1960-1966)
Tafawa Balewa’s NPC political party did not have an absolute majority after the
1959 election, as a result the NPC and Dr. Azikiwe-led NCNC formed a coalition
government. Balewa of the NPC became Prime Minister while Dr. Azikiwe of the NCNC
became the ceremonial President. Balewa was an accommodating man who believed in
the federal system. To address some of the structural imbalance issues in Nigeria, he
created the Midwestern Region in 1963. but failed to satisfy the agitation for states in the
North and the East.67 Added pressure to Balewa’s leadership was the aborted census of
1962 and the equally controversial recount of 1963.
‘Jonas Isawa Elaigwu, “Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria.” Publius 2 I (1991): 129-




Balewa’s leadership style was characterized as “reconciliation” and his sensitivity
to the Nigerian political groups was shown in one of his speeches: “The people from the
North, from the East and from the West have been kind and loyal to me... .and I will
l)lcler death to any situation that will force me to repay their act of kindness and loyalty
to me with an act of evil.”3 The regions challenged the central government leadership of
Balewa in foreign and economic development matters. Balewa declared a state of
emergency in the Western region to curb the crises in that region. The culminating crises
in the West, Tiv minority uprising in the Middle Belt, and the Adaka Boro rebellion in
the East were all responsible for military intervention in January 1966. Balewa was one
of the Nigerian leaders killed in the January 1966 coup. Before his death Balewa was able
to create the Midwestern region out of the West in 1963. It was the rising ethno
regionalism, regional challenge to the center, and consequential lawlessness from
uprisings in the regions that attracted the military to restore order.
General Ironsi (Jan., 1966—July, 1966)
According to Jinadu, “...the civil unrest that erupted in the North following the
proclamation of the unification decree of 24 May 1966, which formally abolished federal
government in the country, was partly responsible for the counter-coup of July 1966 and
the repeal of the unification decree by another decree reinstating federalism.”5Regional
quest for autonomy pushed the north to foresee General Ironsi declaration of unitary
system as an Ibo attempt to dominate the country.
3Ibid., 130.
1lbid., 131.
L. Adele Jinadu, “Federalism, the Consociational State. and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria,’ Publius
15(1985): 82
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According to Filaigwu, (leneral Ironsi’s slow response to either create sub national
regions or centralize political power was due in part for the following reasons. First,
Ironsi’s immediate concern was to establish certain institutions of governance: Supreme
Military Council (SMC), and the Federal Executive Council (FEC). Secondly, Ironsi
wanted to gain the loyalty of the North, and to meet the needs of the South for more
radical change. On May 24 1966, General Ironsi decreed Nigeria a “unitary state” and in
essence abolished the regions and federalism in Nigeria.6 Ironsi saw the regions, ethnic
political parties and ethnic unions as the factors that fueled the crises of the first republic.
His administration was characterized by ‘Unitarianism” as it actively abolished regions
and centralized the civil services.
The Northerners were not pleased with the centralization of institutions and
mobilized against Ironsi administration. Shehu Othman stated that the defunct northern
region civil service representatives provided the stimulus and focus of opposition to the
Ironsi regime. This group transformed into the “The Kaduna Mafia” (amalgam of
northern politicians, intelligentsia, top bureaucrats, managers, investors, gentlemen
farmers, and military and police commanders) and sponsored and encouraged Northern
protest against unification decree promulgated by General Ironsi.7 Consequentially
General Ironsi paid with his life for his “unitary” government because of revenge by
northern soldiers for the January 1966 coup, in which the north lost most of its own
leaders to the Ibo-led coup.8
‘ Elaigwu, “Federalism,” 132-133.
Shehu Othman, “Classes, Crises and Coup: The Demise of Shagaris Regime.” Africaii Affiir 83
(Oct., 1984): 447.
8 Elaigwu, “Federalism,” 134.
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General Gowon (1966-1975)
The January 1966 coup was seen as an Ibo coup by the northerners who retaliated
in the July 1966 coup in which Ibo military officers and civilians were slaughtered in the
northern region. The military governor, Lt. Colonel Emeka Ojukwu of the Ibo-dominated
Eastern region refused to recognize the authority of Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon as the
Head state of Nigeria. In an effort to resolve the issues of sovereignty or quasi
sovereignty of the regions, Gowon called for the Supreme Military Council (S MC)
meeting. The political climate made it impossible for the meeting to hold within Nigeria.
The Ghanaian Head of state, General Ankrah invited the Nigerian leadership to have the
meeting at Aburi. The “Aburi Accord” outlined how the SMC and Head of state will rule
the country and the regions. According to Elaigwu, the “Aburi Accord” generated new
conflicts as Gowon and Ojukwu read the accord differently. To Ojukwu, Aburi meant
extreme decentralization or quasi sovereignty for the Eastern Region. To Gowon, Aburi
meant a return to first republic constitutional position where the center had exclusive
constitutional To further accommodate Ojukwu and stem his threat of Eastern
Region unilateral action, the SMC promulgated the decree No. 8 which stated that “only
with the concurrence of the Head of the Federal Military Government and all the Military
governors can decrees be promulgated.” Instead of reciprocating the goodwill, Ojukwu
proceeded to enact edicts seizing federal properties in the Eastern Region. When Ojukwu
9lbid., 134.
‘° Jonas Isawa Elaigwu. “Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria,” Publius 21(1991): 135.
‘‘Ibid., 135.
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stiiiiiioncd the elders and Chiefs for consultation on 26 May 1967, Gowon responded by
declaring a state ol emergency on May 27, 1967. Gowon proceeded to remove decree 8
by assuming full powers and creating twelve states out of the four regions.’2
Gowon did not simply divide up the Eastern Region into three but divided up the
North into six slates and West into two (Lagos and the West) and the Mid West remained
as a state. To reverse the regional dominance, Gowon extracted powers from the new
states to strengthen the center. The federal government took over control of the
Marketing Boards, Universities and Income Tax management. Primary and secondary
educations were also moved from residual to concurrent list to allow federal interference.
According to Shehu Othman, the “Kaduna Mafia” or the northern elite felt that Gowon’s
over-reliance on “Super Permanent Secretaries” meant virtual exclusion of the group
from public policy and allocation of resources. As the North felt that Gowon no longer
served the interest of the north, the Kaduna Mafia set to mobilize the northern civil and
military support to bring Gowon down.’3 Gowon was overthrown while attending the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Kampala, Uganda in 1975.
Mohammed/Obasanjo (1975-1979)
General Murtala Mohammed was an ally of General Gowon during the war years
(1967-1970) but became a staunch opponent to Gowon’s administration in the later years.
Naturally, the young officers that deposed Gowon gravitated to Mohammed as their new
Commander-in-Chief. General Mohammed agreed with Gowon on continued federalism
‘2lbid., 136.
3 Shehu Othman. “Nigeria: Power for Profit-Class. Corporatism. and Factionalism in the
Military” in Contemporary West African States , eds.. D.B.C. O’Brien. John Dunn, and Richard Rathbone
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 124.
47
br Nigeria and proceeded to appoint Justice Ayo Irikefe as chairman of the committee on
state creation. By February 1976, Mohammed created seven additional states and this
brought the total to 19 states. As the creation of new states failed to quench the thirst for
more states, Mohammed looked for other ways to affect an efficient bureaucratic
government. Mohammed first purged the civil service and the military of alleged corrupt
officers. He created a Council of States and relegated the governors to this body. The
governors were no longer members of the highest decision-making body in the country
known as the Supreme Military Council. This is significant as it shows how each state
creation systematically diminished the state political and economic power.
According to Jinadu, the Mohammed administration emasculated the states
further by exclusively taking on theresponsibility of university education.’5State
universities were taken over by the central government. The federal government also took
over the radio/television networks and major newspapers like the Daily Times and New
Nigeria.’6It is ironic that Mohammed was killed ten days after the creation of states.
Jinadu stated that Mohammed’s mobilization leadership style in a reconciliation
environment may have been partly responsible for his An ethno
linguistically diverse country like Nigeria cannot be run without consensus and
sensitivity.
As second in command, General Obasanjo ascended to power when Mohammed
was killed in 1976. Obasanjo continued with Mohammed’s programs but also instituted
‘ Elaigwu, “Federalism,” 137.
‘ Jinadu, “The Consociational State,” 88.
6 Elaigwu, “Federalism,” 138.
7lhid., 138.
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the “hind Use l)ecree” in the 1979 dralt constitution. AlThr the constitutional drafting of
1979, Ohasanjo successfully disengaged the military from power and handed power
peacelilIy to a duly elected president of Nigeria in 1979. General Obasanjo was
applaudcd worldwide for a peacelul military hand-over to a democratically elected
civilian regime.
Shagari (1979-1983)
President Shehu Shagari was the first Executive President of Nigeria. Since
different states were run by Governors from political parties other than that of the
President. squabbling and state nationalism emerged. States like Plateau, Oyo and Kwara
threatened to take over federal television stations for inadequate coverage of state
government activities. States also raised the issue that the stations were taken over by the
military without compensation to the states.18
The Shagari administration witnessed squabbling over state creation compounded
by the stringent constitutional requirement for creating states. According to Suberu, the
1979 Constitution required that: (a) a request, supported by at least two thirds majority of
members (representing the area demanding the creation of the new state in the following
houses: Senate and House of Representative, State House of Assembly, and Local
Government Council). (b) a proposal for state creation is thereafter approved in a
referendum by at least two-thirds majority of the people of the area where the demand for
creation of the state originated: (c) the result of the referendum is then approved by a
simple majority of all the states of the Federation supported by a simple majority of
‘ Elaigwu, “The Consociational State,” 140.
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members of the I louses of’ Assembly; and ((I) the proposal is approved by a resolution
passed by two—thirds majority of members of each [louse of (lie Natiollal Assernbly.U
The stringent nature of the constitutional requirement was unattractive to the ruling party
and state agitators alike. Naturally, the ruling party National Party of Nigeria (NPN)
appointed one of their own, the Vice President Dr. Alex Ekwueme to head the inter-party
committee on state creation. Ekwuerne’s committee simplified the complex constitutional
provisions on state creation to simply imply “that a proposal for a new state needed to be
approved only by a two-thirds majority of the people of the area concerned who actually
voted in referendum on the issue ,,20
The House of Representatives responded by setting up its own Committee headed
by Abubakar Tuggar. Once the Senate and the House approve their bills on state creation,
the president signed the “Creation of States and Boundary Adjustments (Procedure) Act
1982.2 Neither the constitutional instruction nor the Ekwueme recommendation was
followed during validation of requests into proposal for state creation. For example, the
Tuggar committee validated 21 of the 40 requests on the basis of regional equity and
partly constitutional instruction.22The House adopted the Tuggar report recommendation
of 21 states but buckled under intense pressure from state movements and agitators and
added eight new requests to be validated. The senate recommended that 48 requests be
validated and put up for referendum.23
‘° Suberu. ‘The Strugg1e,’ 508.
20Ibid.,511.
21Ibid.,511.
22 Suheru, The Struggle,” 5 Ii.
23Ibid..516.
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The semite’s action was repudiated I)y various quarters in Nigeria. The New
Nigeria opined that “by choosing to throw nearly all the demands for the creation of new
states to referenda, the Senate has abdicated its responsibility.”24In the face of harsh
criticism, the senate hurried into a joint committee with the 1—louse of Representatives and
ratified the validation of 29 requests for states.25 The economic crises of the period
exposed the impracticability of adding 29 states to the 19 already in existence. A military
intervention in December 1983 brought the Shagari regime and its state creation process
to a halt.26
Shagari was a moderate and humble man who was conciliatory to other party
leaders. His flaw was the inability to control his subordinates who flagrantly looted the
public treasury and their conspicuous display of looted wealth was to the dismay of the
military and other Nigerians. The military and Kaduna Mafia used Shagari’s moderation
and sense of equity against him as were evidenced in the Chadian affair, Libyan crises,
Cameroonian border skirmish, Ojukwu’s pardon and remedy of grievances by Ibo civil
services and army officers. According to Othman, the 1980 disastrous peacekeeping in
Chad was blamed on meager finance of the military.27 The military was dismayed over
their loss at the Cameroonian border and preferred military action. Shagari also restrained
the military from tough reprisals against the Chadian forces for capture of some Nigerian
21Ibid..516.
25mid.. 16.
26 Elaigwu, Federalism.” 140.
27 Othman, “Power tor Profit.” 134.
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soldiers. To compound matters, Shagari pardoned Col. Ojukwu, the rebel leader of the
defunct Biafran army?8
Shagari also restored seniority to Ibo civil servants and military personnel who
lost their seniority due to their participation in the war in support of Biafra (East)?9The
culmination of these factors and the economic crises of the early 1980s created an
environment that allowed the organization of northern elite and the military to seek
restoration of northern rule and protected their interests above others. All these are
significant realizing that the northern elite wanted to protect their business and political
interests through northern military apparatus. Regional interest at that point became
paramount above individual state interest The slogan of “one north, one people”
continues to be relevant as it was in the First Republic of 1963-1966.
M*jor-General Bubarl (1983-1985)
When Major-General Buhari took over in December 1983, his army fraternal
partners dominated his administration. He was not very sensitive to the south or
extensively implementing the federal character in his top governing personnel. According
to Othmnn, only eight of his twenty SMC members were from the south?° His
administration emphasized expansion of Abuja (the federal capital), ban on pornography,
deflationary economic policy, and a ban on labor strikes and authoritarianism. The
regime instituted the so-called War Against Indiscipline (WAD, which included issues
like dishonorable conduct, sanitation, queuing, and family life.
28IbkL, 134.
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General Buhari quickly rounded up the political leadership of the Shagari
adiniiiistration and hurled them into detention. ‘[‘he southerners resented the fact that the
ex-prcsi(lcnt was under house arrest while his vice president a southerner was detained.3’
‘Iwo factions grew in his ruling council and the Babungida camp wanted the political
detainees released or charged while the Buhari camp wanted a harsher treatment. The
political detainees issue and Buhari’s refusal to accept an IMF recommendation were
partly responsible for his down fall. Babangida was of the view that the administration
failed to consult and co-operate while arrogating knowledge of all problems and
solutions.32 BLlhari did not create any states when he was removed from office in a coup
d’etat in 1985.
General Babangida Administration
General Babangida came to power in a bloodless coup in 1985 and expressed his
willingness to a transition into a civilian government. Such openness revived the agitation
for states. To assuage such push for states, Babangida appointed a17 member Political
Bureau to examine and recommend if states would be created and the viable number to
be created. The Political Bureau was divided between those that wanted creation of Akwa
Ibom and Katsina only, while other members wanted creation of six states including
Akwa Ibom and Katsina.33 The relative intensity and longevity of the demand for Akwa
Ibom and Katsina was recognized by a section of the Bureau, and Five-man Committee
appointed to examine the issue further. Armed Forces Ruling Council ultimately ruled to
Ibid.. 137.
32 [bid.. 140.
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create the two states in September, 1987. The 1987 state creation highlighted the
increasing influence of state creation on exposing new minorities and how rnarginalized
these groups are in those states. Katstina and Akwa Ibom states created in 1987 are good
examples of the aforementioned marginalization of groups through state creation.
According to Suberu, including the Oron community into Akwa Ibom instead of
the new Cross River state encourages marginalization of groups.34 Member of the Oron
community had asked to be included in the Cross River where a natural boundary of
water separates them from Akwa Ibom. Lack of adequate consultation led to such eior in
creating states. Another example of marginalization resulting from the 1987 state creation
is the creation of Katstina out of Kaduna. Katstina was carved out of Kaduna to segment
mostly Muslim area into Katstina, while leaving neither Muslim nor Hausa minorities in
southern Zaria of the Kaduna state.35 The minorities of Kaduna state, mostly in the
southern Zaria part of the state still felt dominated by the 1-lausa emirate of Zau-Zau (pre
colonial empire). These minorities of southern Zaria are now agitating for the split of
Kaduna state into Zau-Zau (Hausa-Muslim) and Jema (mostly minorities).36
The terms “Ethnic Minorities”, “Marginal”, and “Marginalization” need to be
clarified to better understand groups seeking states and how these terms impact that push
for states. Before the 1940s, Nigeria had over 374 ethnic minorities. These groups were
classified majority and minority groups with the creation of 3 regions: East, West and
North in the late 1940s.37 The 1967 state creation of the Mid-Western Region gave the
34Ibid.,518.
Osaghae, “The Nigeria Experience,” 10.
36Ibid.. 10.
Osaghae, “The Nigeria Experience.” 4.
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Mo Illinorily (l()Iuillance over smaller minorities in the Mid—West. The 1967 era minor
iiiinoritics of the Mid—West include (lie tJrhobo, ltsetkiri, and Ora. With the 1976 state
creation, the Middle-Belt state of Benue- Plateau was split into Benue and Plateau states.
The ‘[iv minority in the former Benue—Plateau 0W became the dominant minority in
Benue state over the smaller Edoma group.35
The creation of new states continued to bring up minorities that now control the
state and dominate smaller minority groups in the new state. The 1987 state creation of
Akwa Ibom and Katstina from Cross River and Kaduna was not different as the Hausa
Fulanj in Kaduna continued to dominate the Southern Zaria minorities in Kaduna.39 The
1991 and 1996 state creation continued to show pattern of minority groups dominating
smaller minorities. The Ijaws dominated the Ogonis and Adonis in the old Rivers but
became even more dominant in the new Bayelsa. Marginal minorities on the other hand
are groups cut off from their kin who are majority in the neighboring regions or states.
An example of these marginal groups of the pre-1967 states are the Yorubas of Ilorin and
Kabba provinces of Northern Nigeria, and the Western lbos.1°The Ijaw is a marginal
ethnic group scattered into Bayelsa, Delta, Ondo, and Edo states. Only Bayelsa offers
predominant Ijaw state while their other communities are seeking relocation to Bayelsa or
their own local governments.41Lastly, Marginalization refers to ethnic groups’ perception
Suberu, “The Struggle.” 504.




of non inclusion 01. unacceptable level of inclusion into the Nigerian political power, and
resource distrihution/allocation at the center and at state/local level.4
Osaghae points out that ethnic and religious balance should be factored into the
equation of remedying marginalization. This definition highlights the problem of how
every Nigerian group majority or proper minority have used the cry of marginalization to
demand new states and services from the central government. Some of the groups
claiming marginalization include the the Ogonis, Ijaws, Urhobos, Itsetkiri, the Yorubas
and lbos.43
Agwuele suggested that these aforementioned marginalized groups are now
emerging as the models of ethnic nationalism from marginalized groups in Nigeria. These
groups are not simply claiming marginalization but have developed ethnic nationalistic
groups to fight against their margmalization. The Ogoni organized the Movement for the
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP---militant). The Ijaws formed the Ijaw National
Congress (militant). The Urhobo and Itsetkiri have the Egbesu Youths (militant). The
Yorubas have the Afenifere (political) and Oodua People’s Congress (militant). The Ibos
have the Oha Na Eze (political) and Movement for the Realization of the Sovereign State
of Biafra (MASSOB-rnilitant).44
In addition to the marginalization of groups within and between states, Nigeria
was witnessing unprecedented economic decline of the late 1980s due to the plummeting
oil prices. The northerners were complaining about not receiving enough positions in
42 Osaghae. “The Nigeria Experience,” 19.
Agwuele, “Military Occupation,” 354.
Ibid.. 354.
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l3ahangida’ s administration while the southerners, especially eastern Ihos wanted more
states to balance the number of states held by core groups (Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba). To
avoid further erosion of northern support, Babangida signed Nigeria into the organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986. The southerners were appeased in the ensuing
state creation exercise in 1991.
The increasing religious dichotomy in the country was heightened by the
enlistment of Nigeria into OIC. The restlessness in the country was also exacerbated by
the economic downturn resulting from depressed oil prices and the acceptance of IMF
conditionality of austerity measures and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).
In the face of the lore-mentioned pressures, Babangida agreed to create nine additional
states on August 27, 1991.46 Political expediency of garnering legitimacy in a politically
and divisively charged environment became imperative for the ruling junta. In all,
Babangida was a reconciliatory leader who sought to institute structural economic and
political changes. In short term, his economic change was riddled with spiraling interest
rates and volatile exchange rate. The liberalization of the markets has brought enormous
growth in the present Nigerian economy.
General Abacha’s Regime (1993-1998)
According to Suberu, the annulment of June 12, 1993 election won by Moshood
Kashimawo Olawale (M.K.O.) Abiola, a western Yoruba-man, set in motion several
political and legal activities. First, General Babangida annulled the elections result and
set up an interim government. Second, the court accepted a challenge to the interim
Suberu, “Ethnic Conflict,” 16.
46Ihid., 100.
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government and (lie withholding of election results. Lastly, General Abacha took over the
government and dissolved the legislative arm of government while disregarding the
federal court order in support of the electoral process.47
General Abacha found himself in a very divisive polity because groups from the
six zones challenged the legitimacy of his administration. Abacha became more
aggressive in curbing dissent with brute force. According to Ighodaro, Abacha arrested
and hanged Ken Saro Wiwa and the “Ogoni eight” in his effort to subdue dissent from the
Delta area. In the West, the former Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo was jailed.
General Musa Shehu Yar’adiia of core north was jailed and died mysteriously in jail.48
Yar’ adua represented the northern aristocratic interest whose interests and pressure
Abacha tried to suppress. To assuage the pressure on his administration, in December
1995, General Abacha appointed Chief Arthur Mbanefoh as chairman of a committee on
creation of states and local governments. Despite 72 requests, on October 1, 1996,
Abacha created six states out of the six zones: North-East, North-West, North-Central,
South-East, South-West and South-South.49Kraxberger added that Abacha carved those
states in an effort to factionalize groups and weaken opposition to his regime.5°General
Abacha’s unexpected death in 1998 ushered in a transitional government of General
Abdulsalam Abubakar. Abubakar transition to civilian rule was completed in May 1999
when Obasanjo was sworn in as the Fourth Republic civilian president.51
° Suberu. “Ethnic Conflict,” xxv.
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SUMMARY OF STATE CREATION AND EThNIC MAKE OF STATES
Various regimes dealt with regimes that created states and those that did not.
Summary and ethnic make-up uses tables 1, 2, and 3 below to highlight the dates of state
creation, rationale, states created and majority-minority make-up of states created. The
tables will also aid in exploring the rationale of governance, economic development and
socio-cultural issues of nation building warranting the creation of those states.
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Table I Summary of State creation and the malority/minOrity make-up. 1963—1967
Dates of States Dominant No. of minority Zones of
Stale creation created Rationale ethnic groups ethnic groups states
1940s last + West Political! Lbo, Yoruba & —
+ North governance Ilausa respectively. 370
1963 Mid-West Political! Bini 13 —
governance
1967 12 States Political!
centralization
North-Western Hausa 54 North West
North-Eastern Kanuri. Fulani + Hausa 205 North East
Kano Hausa 9 North West
North-Central Hausa 33 North West
Benue-Plateau Tiv, Idoma, Igala, 84 N. Central
Birom, Angas, Yergarn,
Hausa
Kwara Yoruba, Ebira, Igala 20 N. Central
Western Yoruba 2 S. West
Lagos Yoruba 2 S. West
Mid-West Bini, Urhobo, Ijaw, 13 5. South
Itsekiri. Ibo
South-Eastern Ibibio, Efik 36 S. South
East-Central Ibo 1 S. East
Rivers State Ijaw, Ogoni, Andoni, 10 S. South
Ibo
Adapted from Mustapha, 2005
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I’able 1 highlights and summarizes states created in the l940s, 1963, and 1967.
Three regions were created by the British colonial administration in the 1940s. The
regions created in the 1940s were East, West and North. The rationale for creating those
states was simply to ease administration of 374 ethnic groups. This administrative
convenience raised fears of domination and inadequate representation and access to
regional/national government by the minorities.
By 1963, the Nigerian ruling coalition of the NPC and NCNC created the Mid
West out of the Western region. The Benin people dominated the Mid-West, Yorubas the
Western region, the Ibos the East, and Hausa-Fulani the North.
The 1967 state creation was the first time Nigeria moved away from regional
government to 12 state structure. The rationale of the military government was to end the
obstruction o national governance by the regional governments and to ensure that the
regional governments desist from dominating the minorities. Table 1 indicates that the
Hausas were the dominant ethnic group despite 54 ethnic minorities in the North Western
state. Dominance of the Hausas included access to government and jobs.
The North Eastern state had Kanuri, Fulani and Hausa as the dominant ethnic
groups in addition to 205 ethnic minorities. Kano’s dominant ethnic groups are the
Hausas while 9 other groups form the minority. North Central state included the people
of Kaduna and Katstina and the state was dominated by the Hausa. The 12 states all had
minorities being dominated by one major group or the other. The challenges of governing
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these stales are not limited to access to slates jobs, e(lucation healthcare but also the
practical consequence of state creation.
One such governance issue raised by state creation is the civil service personnel
vacuum. Personnel issues arise from civil servants leaving a new state to go and serve in
their own state. There are those that want to remain in their positions but are forced out
by state indigenes that may or may not qualify for those positions. The new state may not
have adequate personnel to feel positions abruptly opened by incessant state creation.
However the federal government did acknowledge these personnel issues and responded
by establishing a human resource pool to meet some of the personnel needs of the states.
A National council was set up by the federal government to coordinate personnel needs
of the states through that inter-state personnel pool.52
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Table 2. Summary of 19 State Creation and the Majority/Minority Make-Up, 1976
States lormer1y Dominant No. of minority Zoies of
called Rationale ethnic groups ethnic.groups states
N.W. economic Hausa 12 North West
Kano economic Hausa 9 North West
N. E. economic Kanuri 29 North East
N. E. economic Hausa 64 North East
Kwara economic Yoruba, Ebira, Igala 20 North Central
Western economic Yoruba - South West
N. Central economic Hausa, Gwari 19 N. Central
N. West economic Hausa 33
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Anambra East—Central CCOHOIUiC Iho —— South—East
Adapted from M LLStapha, 2005
Table 2 highlights and summarizes the 19 state structures of 1976. The 12 state
structure of 1967 was carved up into 19 states in 1976. The North Eastern state had 205
ethnic minorities while few ethnic groups of Kanuri. Fulani, and Hausas dominated that
state. The North Eastern was divided into three states namely Borno (29 ethnic
minorities), Bauchi (64 ethnic minorities), and Gongola with I The North Western
state had 45 ethnic minorities and 1-lausas as the dominant ethnic group. Kano remained
Kano state and had 9 ethnic minorities and Hausas were also the dominant ethnic group.
The North Western state only changed its name to Sokoto state. Hausas were the
dominant group in Sokoto state and they had 12 ethnic minority groups.
The North Central state had 33 ethnic minorities and the name was changed to
Kaduna state. The four North Central geographical zone states are the following: Kwara
(20), Niger (19), Benue (12), and Plateau (72), bringing the total number of ethnic
minorities of the four states to 123. The South West zone had four states during the
1976 era of 19 states. These states include Oyo and Ogun with no ethnic minorities. The
other two states are Ondo and Lagos with two ethnic minorities each. Yoruba is the
dominant ethnic group in the four states.
The South East had only two states namely Imo and Anambra in the 19 state
structure of 1976. Anambra had one ethnic minority that made up only 8 percent of her
population while Imo had none. The Ibos remained the dominant ethnic group in the two
states of Anambra and Imo. In the South-South geographical zone, the states of Rivers,
Mustapha, “Ethnic Structure,” 4-7.
Ibid., 6.
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Cross River, and E3cndel had 10, 29, and 13 ethnic minorities respectively.55 The
dominant ethnic groups in Rivers state are Ijaws, Ogoni, Andoni, and Ibo. Cross Rivers
state is (lorninatcd by the Efik and Ibibio. Lastly, Bendel has five dominant ethnic groups
of Bini, Urhobo, Ijaw, Itsekiri, and [ho and 13 ethnic minorities.
The predominant rationale of the 1976 creation of states was economic. Those
seeking the states were motivated by the rationale of gaining rapid economic
development from new states. Although economic rationale was the predominant
rationale in the 1976 state creation, however issues of governance manifested during this
period also. One such governance issue emanating from state creation is the problem of
inadequate personnel pool. As new states are created, there arises a personnel pooi
vacuum in the new states. Good civil servants are often forced out to return to their own
states where they may not have the seniority they enjoy in the old state. Indigenes push to
oust the experienced personnel to return to their own state of origin.
As states were created, so was the federal erosion of state powers. To compensate
for the federal intrusion and extraction of state power, the states gravitated towards the
local governments and tried extracting the local residual powers. States resorted to
arbitrary dissolution, of local councils, proliferation of local governments, and intrusion
into local government lucrative functions like markets and motor parks.56 States
proliferation of local governments can be seen in the 1984 data where local governments
Ibid., 6.
Alex Gboyega, Protecting Local Governments from Arbitrary State and Federal Interference:
What Prospects for the 1990s?” Publius (Autumn 1991): 50
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have ballooned From 304 to I lowevcr, the powers ol the stales to intrude Ofl
localities were curtailed in 1 99 by the l3abangida administration.
‘fable 3. Summary of 17 State Creations from 1987-1996: Total States of 36
States No. of minority Formerly Dominant Zones of
Created ethnic groups under Rationale ethnic groups states Year
Kalsina I Kaduna socio-eultural Hausa N.W. 1987
Akwa Ibom 7 Cross River socio-cultural lbibio S.S. 1987
Abia — Imo “ Ibo S.E. 1991
Anambra - Anambra “ Ibo S.E. 1991
Delta 3 Bendel “ Urhobo, Ijaw, S.S. 1991
Ibo, Itsekiri
Kebbi 4 Sokoto Hausa N.W. 1991
Kogi - Kwara “ Igala. Ebira,
Okun,Yoruba N.C. 1991
Osun - Oyo “ Yoruba S.W. 1991
Taraba * Gongola “ Fulani, Hausa N.E. 1991
Jigawa Kano “ Hausa-Fulani, N.W. 1991
Kanuri, Badawa
Yobe * Borno “ Kanuri N.E. 1991
Bayelsa Rivers “ Ijaw S.S. 1996
Ebonyi 1 Enugu + Abia “ Ibo S.E. 1996
Ekiti * Ondo “ Yoruba S.W. 1996
Ibid., 50.
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(iombe 10 l3auchi “ I lausa N.E. 1996
Nasarawa * Plateau “ Birom, Angas, N.C. 1996
Yergarn, 1-lausa
Lam lara 6 Sokoto “ F-Iausa N.W. 1996
Adapted from Mustapha. 2005. (NEzNorth East. NW=North West. NC=North Central. SE= South East,
SWSouth West. SS= South South).
Table 3 highlights the remaining 17 states created in addition to the 19 states from
1987 to 1996. The cumulative number of states from 1987 to 1996 stood at 36 states. The
1980s and 90s were predominated by socio-cultural rationale for creating states. The
regions/zones clamor for equity in governance via states can be seen in the close number
of states various geographical zones got from new state creation. There were 7 states
created in the North West zone, 6 in the North East, 6 in the North Central, 6 in the South
West, 6 in the South-South. and 5 in the South East zone. The number of states in six
geographical zones appears to be uniform on the surface. However, the north has 19
states when you include the middle belt and the core north. The disparity in number and
size continues to influence who governs the country. The north continues to have superior
numbers in elected officials and who gets influence or who becomes the president of the
country. Equally important is the fact that the majority groups of Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and
Yoruba controls 22 of the 36 states. That translates to real power of governance where
they are better positioned to be governors and other top government officials.
The predominant rationale for creating the 17 states from 1987 to 1996 was socio
cultural. States like Kaduna had 33 ethnic minorities sandwiched between the majority
Hausa-Fulani. Cries of marginalization and the need to redress the treatment of minorities
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finally came in 1)87 when Kaduna was divided into Kaduna and Katsina states. The 32
ot the ethnic minorities were put into Kaduna state while one remained in Katsina state.55
In addition, autonomous local communities were created in Kaduna to further address the
inadequacies with regard to access to power and governance by the minorities. When the
Ihos realized that the other majority groups had five or more states, they demanded
creation of Abia, Enugu, and Anambra to bring their total to five states. Abacha
administration created the last six states of Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Gombe, Nassarawa,
and Zamfara in 1996. Each of the six geographical zones of NW, NE, NC, SE, SW, and
SS got a state. It clearly speaks to the effort of the Abacha junta in appeasing groups
other than creating states for purely administrative and economic development motives.
58 Suberu. “The Struggle,” 520.
CIIAP[ER SIX
Analysis of I)ata
[he analysis of data includes the examination of state creation rationales that
claim to have affected national progress, nation building and good governance. The
Northern Nigerians responded to the January 1966 coup with the July 1966 counter coup
in which [bo civilians and military personnel were massacred in the north. The Ibos
threatened secession of the eastern region from Nigeria. General Gowon responded in
1967 by carving the country into 12 states for various reasons. First, the state creation
was an opportunity to correct the dominance of minorities in the East, West and Northern
Regions. Second, the creation provided an opportunity to make an alliance with the all-
grateful minorities within the new states. Every administration in Nigeria that has created
states has often outlined either a political, economic or cultural rationale for creating
those states. Analyzing these political, economic and cultural rationales is also a measure
of the efficacy of state creation.
Since state creation rationales claim to promote national progress (economic),
good governance (political) and nation building (cultural) in Nigeria, evaluation of data
can only affirm or disprove the claims. The national progress will entail evaluation of
data related to ‘rapid economic development,’ making government more accessible to the
people, and promoting federal character issues. The good governance will entail a look at
the political issues of domination and marginal ization and also the military effort at
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legit iiiiizat ion by creating states. Finally, there are challenges to nation building from
cthno—regionalism and religious conflicts.
Evaluating Whether State Creation Bolstered Good Governance
The political rationale of ‘allaying minority fears of domination’ by the civilian
and military governments was a way to bolster good governance. The Northern People’s
Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) jointly carved
out the Mid-West region from the Western Region in 1963. The 1963 creation of the
Mid-West was an opportunity to resolve one of the real concerns of majority domination.
For the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria Citizens
(NCNC), the real motivation for creating the Mid-west was to weaken the opposition
party, the Action Group (AG). To weaken the AG, the ruling coalition decided to extract
the Mid-West from the Western Region and consequently gain a footing in the Mid-West
itself.
The 1963 and 1967 state creations were precipitated by one crisis or another.
Creation of the Mid-West was preceded by the 1962 Western crisis. The Regions of the
East and West felt that the Census counts of 1962 were inaccurate and rigged by the
North that ran the central government. The West reacted violently in protest to the
inaccurate Census count of 1962. The federal government responded by declaring a state
of emergency in the West and appointing a federal administrator from a faction of the
Action Group that supported the creation of the Mid-West.’ The 1967 state creation was a
way to douse the Eastern-Ibo secessionist bid, political fragility from the Western crises
Suheru. “Ethnic Conflict,” 84.
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of 1963, 1964, and 1965, and persistent Northern Minority uprisings of 1962—1965. The
West rioted again in 1963 over the Census re-count of 1963. The Western region
dissatisfaction with the general election of 1964 gave the west another reason for riots
and political hooliganism. The 1965 Western region crises were also marked by rigging
and irregularities, and indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians by party thugs. The
Northern minorities of the Middle Belt (Tiv) rioted from 1962 to 1965 over the NPC rule
of the north without minority consideration.2
The regional threat to national unity was real in the 1960s as was evidenced by
the January 1966 coup. The January 1966 coup was considered an Ibo coup because only
members of the northern leadership were killed. The new Ibo Head of State, General
Aguiyi Ironsi’s attempt at unitary government was perceived as a further attempt to
entrench Ibo domination of the Northern Region. The northern response was the July
1966 counter coup, and killing of Ibos in the north. The Ibos threatened secession of the
Eastern Region from Nigeria. The regional governments of the 1960s had enormous
power and threatened national unity at every turn.
To curb the regional powers, General Gowon divided the country into 12 states in
1967 for various reasons. First, this was an opportunity to correct the dominance of
minorities in the East, West and Northern regions. Second, it was an opportunity to make
an alliance with the all-grateful minorities within the new states. The Calabar, Ogoja, and
Rivers (COR) states of the eastern region were critical in dousing the Ibo secessionist hid
by cutting the Ibos off supply lines, particularly access to the sea and most importantly
2Atofarati, 5.
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cult ing them oil from oil sales. The eastern region went to war over the creation of states
that abolished regional governments. War was ultimately fought from 1967 to 1970 but
the nation was saved as the fragmented states were rendered too weak to adequately resist
the center.
The question that remains is whether state creation has resolved issues of political
instability and disruption of good governance. To answer the instability question,
Ornolade attributed the political instability of the country to regional imbalance where the
northern size and population out-weigh the other regions.3 Following Omolade’s premise,
state creation could have resolved the imbalance and restore national unity. The reality is
that the big three (Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba) are locked in a contest to gain equal number
of states at the expense of the minority groups that need them. The big three are the
majority in 22 of the 36 states.
The fight for states has gone full circle from 12 to 36 states, and political volatility
continues to plague the country as new minority formations demand for their own states.
The 1967 exercise was hastily done as the government created those states in part to stem
eastern minority support for the East and assure federal support from the Eastern
minority. The haste of the 1967 state creation is plagued by unresolved boundary issues,
and sizes of the states continue to plague national unity. The creation of the 19 state
structures in 1976 did not resolve the pressures on national unity. The government simply
implemented six of the twelve recommendations from the 1976 Irikefe Commission on
Adejuyibe Omolade, The Size of States and Political Stability in Nigeria,” African Review (Sept 1973): 175
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resolving the interstate boundary issues.4 Those unresolved boundary issues and state
creation agitation were addressed again in 1987. The 1980s was characterized by
unprecedented peacetime hardship resulting from plummeting oil prices. Tensions
intensilcd during that period when the government accepted the Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) that brought more economic hardship on Nigerians.
The political climate was further poisoned when General Babangida signed
Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference. It was under these
conditions that two states were created in 1987. The continuing fragility of the country
and intensity of agitation pushed the administration to create more states to ensure some
relief and measure of unity. State creation then became a tool by the military dictatorship
to garner semblance of support from the elite. The ploy of garnering legitimacy by caving
to demands of states from elite agitators became the norm throughout the Nigeria military
regimes. Twelve years of Babangida and Abacha regimes (1984-1996) were marked by
the creation of 19 states. Only 17 states were created in 20 years (1963-1983). The era of
the most severe military repressioi1 coincided with the most rapid creations of states. The
1980s and 1990s were termed the most repressive era as civic unrest and community
protest were pronounced. ‘Carrots’ in the form of states were given to calm elites while
persistent opposition was suppressed.
In addition to the political history of state creation, and evidence of political
rationalization, quotes from some of the major actors’ rationale why states were created
will be reviewed. General Gowon’s creation of 12 states in 1967 set in motion state
4
Suheru, Ethnic Conflict.” 92.
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creation by (lie military that lasted up to 1996. In General Gowon’s broadcast to the
nation on May 27, 1967 on why he is dividing the country into twelve he said this:
As you are all aware Nigeria has been immersed in an extremely grave crisis for
almost eighteen months. ---What is at stake is the very survival of Nigeria as one
political and economic unit. --- The Eastern Region Government --- purporting to
seize all federal statutory corporations and federal revenues collected in the East.-
Despite all these, I have spared no effort to conciliate the East in recognition of
their understandable grievances and Fears since tragic incidents oF 1966. To this
end I agreed with my other colleagues on the Supreme Military Council to the
promulgation of the Decree 8 which completely decentralized the government of
this country. the response of the East has been completely negative. ---The
main obstacle to future stability in this country is the present structural imbalance
in the Nigerian Federation. Even Decree No. 8 or Confederation or Loose
Association will never survive if any one section of the country is in a position to
hold the others to ransom. This is why the item in the Political and Administrative
Program adopted by the Supreme Military Council and published last month.
General Gowon’s speech captures the rationales of state creation as it relates to
good governance, crisis, intergovernmental relations, sovereignty issues, equality issues,
revenue allocation, and why minorities need states. Gowon may have presented the
survival of Nigeria as one political and economic unit as one of his reasons for creating
the twelve states. The more viable issue was sovereignty for the states versus having a
loose federation. General Gowon and the Supreme Military Council’s decree no. 8
completely decentralized government of the country. Emeka Ojukwu, the Military
Governor of the Eastern region rejected that decree.
Why General Gowon proposed decree no. 8 is open to debate for various reasons.
First is the fact that the Eastern government challenged the center in matters of who has
authority over the Ports Authority, Railroads, and Nigeria Airways and of federal
5Nowa Omoigui, (compiler) “Gowon’s Broadcast to the Nation. Dividing Nigeria into Twelve
States” (Herndon: Virginia website, 1999) www.dawodu.com.
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revenues collected in the East. These pressures may have made the Federal government
agreeable to decentralization. It may have been a pioy [‘or the Federal side to buy time in
sorting ways to move forward. Gowon retreated from his position of allowing
decentralization slating that it will never work if one region can hold the nation to
ransom. He asserted that the structural imbalance in the Nigeria federation is an obstacle
to stability. There was no clarification if the “structural imbalance” meant northern size
and population as opposed to the east and west, or if it is four regions being too big and
too powerful to be governed by the center. Gowon’s emphasis on ‘equality’ did finally
point us to where he was going.
General Gowon is from the North Central zone state of Plateau where there are 72
minority groups. Although his group the Angas is one the four dominant ethnic groups in
that state but Angas is real minority outside Plateau state. Being a minority, Gowon
understood the minority plight of needing a state. Gowon also used the Willink Report of
1958 to bolster his claim that minority fears of domination and expression of having
states are documented in that report. What General Gowon left out was the Willink
Report advising Nigeria against state creation. Of the five state creations from 1967 to
1996 by the military, only the 1976 creation was done by a non-minority Head of state.6
Promotion of equality of the ethnic groups by giving minorities numerous states
continued to flourish. The principle of equality also was applied to the Revenue
allocation scheme where 50 percent of all collected oil revenue is divided equally
amongst states.
6 Suberu, “Ethnic Conflict,” 85-102.
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Aller General Gowon created the twelve states, practical governance issues arose.
Some of these issues are resultant boundary issues, and how to manage national
government and sub-national government relations. As states were hastily created, there
were communities separated from their kin. There were also communities scattered in
three states where they had no desire to be. The 1976 creation tried to resolve some of
those issues but continued demands for states beg to differ that all are satisfied. Secondly,
the 1967 state creation left authorities jointly owned by regions undivided. In the north,
an Interim Common Services Agency (ICSA) was opened to administer jointly owned
establishments of the six northern states.7 Similarly when the Eastern region was broken
down into three states in 1967, Eastern States Interim Assets and Liabilities Agency
(ESIALA) was established. ICSA and ESIALA administered institutions commonly
owned in their regions. These Agencies promoted intergovernmental relations by
aggregating regional establishments. However, Gowon’ s administration broke down
these establishments in keeping with the objective of restraining regions from holding the
center to ransom. The Federal military government abolished the ICSA and ESIALA and
blocked that avenue of interstate cooperation.
In addition to having interstate cooperative difficulties, the newly created states
had to contend with limited access to federal government. Constituent states may not
have equal access to the national government. As the northern military leadership
dominated the national government, their states had relative easier access to the center.
States that lacked such access had more difficulties receiving federal funding. States were
John A. A. Ayoade “Electoral Laws and National Unity in Nigeria,” Afrü an Studies Reciet
(Sept 1980): 41.
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fllS() Stlhjtlgatc(1 IH areas of stale administrative structures, national policy making, and
Fiscal relations by the national government. 1)uring the Gowon era (1967—1975), the states
had relatively more influence on national governance as their military governors served
on the highest decision making body in the country called Supreme Military Council. By
the MurtalalObasanjo regime of 1975, the state powers were eroded as national
government took over major state functions, of primary and higher education,
transportation, and communication, and most of the independent taxing powers of the
state.5 The military government also relegated the governors from first tier decision
making body to the third tier called National Council of States.
In addition to the functional issues of governance that bedevils the created states,
there were differences in the perceptions of major political actors in Nigeria relative to
the workability of the present states. These actors include Chief Erneka Ojukwu, General
Obasanjo, General Babangida, General Abacha, and Anthony Enahoro. Chief Emeka
Ojukwu on an interview to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) called for a
Sovereign National Conference (SNC) for Nigeria so that the problems plaguing the
country could be discussed and settled.9 Considering that Ojukwu insisted on Eastern
sovereignty in 1967, it is fair to say that Ojukwu’s call for SNC is tantamount to
advocating sovereignty for the ethnic nationalities. General Obasanjo was more direct in
his assessment by stating the following:
With the atomization of Nigeria by means of state creation almost to the point of
rendering of the constituent units prostrate, I find the concept of zones as the basis
Eghosa Osaghae “The Status of State Governments in Nigerias Federalism.” Pub/his
(1992):185.
British Broadcasting Corporation (Britain), 12 January 2000
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our lcderation worth examining. At this stage of our development, we cannot
abandon the federal system, but perhaps the federating units should be zones
rather than the existing states. Each zone should he large enough to be viable, and
should he made up of local governments. Under this structure, we may be able to
save costs on administration for development.’0
General Obasanjo/Mohammad administration created the 19 state structures in 1976 but
in hindsight speaks to the wastefulness and politicization of state creation. As the states
are proliferated, the monies that could be used for good governance of building
infrastructure and provision of services of health and education are swallowed up by the
state apparatus.
General Babangida and General Abacha used state creation as a means to an end.
Babagida asserted that arguments for state creation were untenable and politically
motivated but creating the states was in the national interest. Abacha argued that
“creation of states, although economically and politically disruptive, had become a
periodic and accepted feature of the country’s politics.” The two leaders highlighted
that it was imperative for regime survival to create states. The governance issues were
relegated as secondary to regime survival. Anthony Enahoro, leader of Movement for
National Reformation (MFR) prescribed the transformation of Nigeria into eight ethnic
based federations. The clamor for zones or federating units is popular but the practicality
of getting states and the leadership running the states to relinquish their statehood will not
be easy.
‘° Suberu, “Ethnic Conflict.” 190.
‘‘Ibid., 103.
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1950177 2.3 15A 10.7 6.0
Policies, External Constraints and EconomicAdapted from Francis Teal, “Domestic
Development,” African Affairs (Jan., 1988): 72
Apart examining the level of good governance advanced by state creation, there
are issues of national progress. Table 4 above would help analyze if state creation has
Table 4 . Structure and Sectoral Growth ol the Nigerian Economy I 95O 1977. GDP are in
Naira millions, 1962 prices
Eour Agriculture As % As % As % Urban As %
Year (total) of of Mann ol non— oF
Averages GDP Mining GDP Facture GDP traded GDP
(I) (2) (3) (4)
1950153 1063.5 61.5 21.6 1.3 42.1 2.5 601.7
1954157 I 199.9 58.7 24.9 1.3 52.9 2.7 767.8
1958161 1475.5 64.0 29.5 1.3 108.6 4.7 693.4
1962/65 1704.3 59.2 85.6 3.0 179.6 6.2 910.1
970/73 1822.7 38.4 751.2 15.8 369.2 7.8 1809.7
1974/77 1788.7 29.1 1016.0 16.5 611.8 10.0 2726.7
Growth Rates.
1950/57 3.0 3.6 5.7 6.1
1954/61 5.2 4.2 18.0 -2.5
1958/65 3.6 26.6 12.6 6.8







helped in improving the national well being of Nigeria.
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Evaluating If State Creation Improved National Progress (Economic Rationale)
‘I’o gauge if rationale of ‘rapid economic development’ for state creation actually
promoted national progress, analysis of socio economic indicators like GDP, economic
pcrlormance, health, education, employment and poverty level are used. All these
indicators will try to estimate how state creation affected the economy.
The use of GDP to evaluate how state creation affected the economy will be
limited because of how petroleum has dominated Nigerian economy at the expense of
other sectors. Table 4 shows how Agriculture dominated the gross domestic product
(GDP) at 61.5% for 1950/53, 58.7% for 1954/57, 64.0% for 1958/61, and 59.2% for
1962/65 but declined to 38.4% for 1970/73, and 29.1% for 1974/77.12 No data was
recorded for the civil war period of 1967/69. The 1970/77 decline of agricultural output
speaks to the increasing emphasis on oil. The dominance of the agricultural sector and its
growth rate of 3.0 for 1950/57, 5.2 for 1954/6 1, and 3.6 for 1958/65 can be attributed to
the high producer prices offered by the marketing boards.’3 The marketing boards of the
regional governments of the pre-independence 1950s and independence 1960s paid high
prices for cash crop produce of groundnuts, palm produce and cocoa.
The subsequent creation of twelve states in 1967 had dire consequences for the
economy. The Agricultural sector growth plunged to -0.5% for the 1970/77. The political
imperative of saving the union and curbing the ability of groups to challenge the center
influenced General Gowon’s decision to abolish regional marketing hoards.’4 The central
12 Francis Teal, “Domestic Policies, External Constraints and economic Development in Nigeria




government deemphasized agriculturc and other sectors of the economy that were the
main stay of the regional government and concentrated on oil as the national product. Oil
became the central government’s economic and political tool since the new states now
relied on oil revenues from the center for 95 percent of their expenditure.
The vulnerability from the mono economy of oil was evident in the 1980s
economic crises resulting from decline in oil prices. Once the central government revenue
from oil declined, the states naturally felt the economic decline. The country’s GDP made
a sharp decline from 5.3 in 1980 to -8.4 in 1981. Between 198 land 1986, excluding 1982
and 1985 when the GDP growth rates were 0.1% and 7.9% respectively, Nigeria
continued to experience a negative growth rate.15 ‘What’s surprising is why states would
be created in 1987 with such dismal aforementioned performance of the economy. Since
these states receive 95 percent of their revenues from the center, the center would have to
dig deeper into her depleted purse to cater for the new created states. There has been no
real effort to improve either state income generation or effective taxation. Per capita
annual growth rate has remained at a negative of -0.7 for 1975/2001 period despite oil
revenues.’6 This dismal state of the economy speaks to the terrible economic state the
created states are. More important is the fact that dependant federating units cannot
advance economic development of their states or the country as a whole without having
economic independence and ability to generate income and taxes.
‘5Abimbola Folake Fatukasi, “Microtinance as a Policy Tool for Poverty Alleviation: A Study of
the Performance of Ten Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria’ (Thesis: Morgan State University, May
2005), 31-2
°United Nations, Human Development Report: Country Data by United Nations Development
Program, 2003, 5.
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Poverty is another economic lactor derailing the assumption that state creation
improved the economic condition of Nigerians. The US Library of Congress Country
Data indicates that per capita income has plunged to about one quarter of its mid 1970s
high, below the level at independence.17Considering this low per capita income and the
fact that 75 percent of the total economy is from the informal sector, strongly suggests
that Nigeria is in dire need of an economic development overhaul.
Table 5: Social Indicators by zone, 1995-1996 (per cent)
I louse-
holds Woflien
Using I louse- using Pregnant Newborn
Stream holds Children Children Literate %imily women children
Or pond without 6— I in 12+ in adults plan— using not
Zone bor water electricity school school I 5+ nine clinics immunized
Northwest 13.6 79.8 34.2 35.2 20.7 2.6 25.3 65.9
Northeast 26.4 78.3 42.3 47.6 25.0 1.4 39.4 60.7
North-
central 44.4 61.2 69.8 73.7 44.7 4.5 66.8 54.0
Southwest 22.6 30.4 94.6 88.9 68.9 12.1 74.7 29.1
Southeast 61.4 47.7 88.3 89.6 75.8 14.9 84.8 29.0
South-
south 50.4 55.7 90.9 87.6 77.2 9.1 60.7 56.9
Source: Adapted from Federal Office of Statistics (1995/1996) by Mustapha: 24
Table 5 explores the poverty index by examining the social indicators and poverty
head counts in Nigeria. The table shows that social economic development has not
improved in Nigeria for the 1995/1996 period. This is significant since 1996 was the last
state creation year in Nigeria. If states were created from 1963 to 1996 and Nigerians still
wallow in poverty, state creation may not have been of much help to improve the
‘ United States Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Country Profile: Nigeria
(Washington D.C. 2006), 2.
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economic well-being of Nigerians. Table 5 shows how the North—West zone has the least
number of households using stream/pond water at 13.6%, while South-East has the
highest number at 61.4%. The rest of the zones have 20 percent or higher for those
without running water. When it comes to electricity, North-West has the largest number
of households without electricity at 79.8% while the South-West has the lowest number
of’ those without electricity at 30.4%. The rest of the zones (Northeast, North Central,
Southeast, and South Southern) have 47.7% or higher for those without electricity.
South west has the highest number of children 6-1 1 years in school (94.6%) while
the Northwest has the lowest number at 34.2%. For education, the southern zones
(Southeast, Southwest, and South-south) continue to have about 90 percent enrollment
for children 6 years and older while the northern states (Northeast & Northwest) have 35-
47.6% (except for the North-central that has average of 7 1.75%). The percentage of the
northern zone literate population stood at: Northwest 20.7%, Northeast 25%, and North-
central 44.7%. This translates to 30 percent average for literate adults in the north. The
average population of the literate in the south stood at 70 percent. The national average
for adult literacy stood at about 51.57 percent.
The Northeast has the lowest number of women using family planning at 1.4%
while the south east has the highest at 14.9 %. The national average of women using
contraceptive stood at 7.43% for the 1995/1996 period. The national average of women
using contraceptive rose to 15% for 1995-200 1 period.18 The average rate of pregnant
‘ United Nations, Human Development Report by United Nations Development Program, 2003.
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women using clinics stood at 58.62% for the 1995/96 period. The Southeast has the
highest number of 84.8 percent while the Northwest has the lowest of pregnant women
using clinics at 25.3%. The United Nations’ Human Development Report 2003 had the
public health expenditure (as % of the GDP) o1 2000 at 0.5 percent while the private
health expenditure stood at 1.2. The health expenditure per capita stood at S 5•9
Table 6: Poverty headcount by zone, 1996 (per cent)
Zone Non-poor Moderately poor Core poor All poor
Northwest 22.8 39.9 37.3 77.2
Northeast 29.9 35.7 34.4 70.1
North-central 35.4 36.7 28.0 64.7
Southwest 39.1 33.4 27.5 60.4
SoLitheast 46.5 35.3 18.2 53.5
South-south 41.8 34.8 23.4 58.2
All Nigeria 29.3 36.3 34.4 70.7
Source: Federal Office of Statistics 1999 in Mustapha: 24
Poverty headcount on zone indicates the level of poverty in Nigeria despite state
creation exercises. Table 6 indicates that Northwest states had 22.8 percent of Non Poor;
Northeast 29.9%, North-central 35.4, Southwest 39.1, Southeast 46.5%, and South-
southern 41.8 %. The national average of 29.3 percent for non poor translates into 70.7
percent of Nigeria population in poverty. Examining poverty data for the period of state
creation indicates that as more states are created over the years, the poverty level keeps
escalating. According to Fatukasi, by 1960 (before state creation) 15 percent of the
‘ United Nations, Human Development Report: Indicators. 2003. 3.
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Nigerian population was pOor. 28 percent by 1980, 46 percent by 1985, 43 percent by
1992, 68 percent by l996.’ The sixty eight percent poverty estimation translates to 80
million of the 120 million population of Nigerian are poor. Some estimates have the
current poor population at 70.7 percent.2’
Neither state creation nor the government poverty programs could adequately deal
with poverty issues in Nigeria. Poverty programs like the 1978 Operation Feed the Nation
(OFN) of the Obasanjo administration; Green Revolution of Shagari administration
(1979-1983); Babangida administration Peoples’ Bank, Directorate of Food Road and
Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), Nigeria Agricultural Land Development Authority
(NALDA) and National Directorate of Employment (NDE). NDE is the only program
still in existence. Abacha administration initiated the Family Economic Administrative
Program (FEAP) in 1998. Miriam Babarigida introduced the Better Life for Rural
Women while Miriam Abacha introduced the Family Support Program during her
husband’s regime. None of these programs have been able to adequately combat poverty
in Nigeria.
The problem of poverty is due to the duplication of all government anti-poverty
programs using the Top/Bottom approach while the BottomlTop approach is needed.
Macro development strategies continue to retard economic development. What are
needed are micro strategies of economic development. Poverty programs should target
the poor but instead have become fanfare by government officials. The president, his
20 Fatukasi. Microtinance.” 5.
21 Abdul R. Mustapha. Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in
Nigeria,” Center for Research on Inequahtv. Human Security (hid Ethnicity, (May 2005): 25
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wife, cabinet along with their state counterparts; governors and commissioners organize
these fanfares about poverty programs that fail to benefit the poor.
Evaluating If State Creation Improved Nation Building
Nation building in the Nigerian context entails bridging those cultural cleavages
that prevent Nigerians from feeling as people. The perceptions of differences among
various Nigeria groups disrupt the unity of Nigerians and exacerbate strife. Some
Nigerians insist that state creation has not improved nation building due to the
consequential cultural differences where ethno-regional, religious, interstate and
communal conflicts persist. Cultural contentions of region, religion, interstate, and
communal issues are seriously derailing the nation-building project. According to Jibrin,
this perception of inequality is driving the ethno-religion and regional mobilization of the
east, west and north conflict (Jibrin p.12).2 Table 7 and 8 show these inequalities that
are driving the ethno-regional, and religious strife.
22 Ibrahim Jibrin, “Political Transition, Ethno-Regionalism. and the Power-Shift’ Debate in
Nigeria,” Journal of Opinion (1999): 12
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[able 7: Composition of the Federal Cabinet,
Number of Ministers by Region and ethnic Origin, 1951-1966
1951- 1954- 1957- 1960- 1965-
Regional/ethnic unit 1954 1957 1958 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1966
Northern
Nigeria
All Ministers 3 3 3 4 9 9 9 9 10
Hausa/Eulani 2 3 3 4 9 9 8 8 9
Minorities 1 — — — — - 1 1 1
Eastern
Nigeria
All Ministers 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3
Igbo 2 2 3 2 2 3 4 3 3
Minorities 1 1 — — — — — — —
Western
Nigeria
Yomba 2 2 4 3 3 5 5 5 8
Mid-western
Minorities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total 9 9 11 10 15 18 18 18 22
Source: Adapted from Osaghae (1989:158)
Table 7 depicts composition of the federal cabinet and the number of ministers by
region. The table indicates that the three major groups dominated the composition of the
cabinet from 1951—1966. The minorities were seriously underrepresented. The Northern
minorities had one minister for the period of 195 1-1954 and 1963 to 1966. The Northern
minorities had no ministerial representation for the period 1954 to 1962. The Eastern
minorities had one ministerial position when Ibos had two and only had representation
from 1951 to 1957. The Eastern minorities lacked representation from 1957 to 1966. The
Mid-Western minorities had one ministerial position from 1951 to 1966 but had less
numbers than the dominant groups of HausalFulani, Ibo and Yoruba. The Ihos had a
comparable number of ministers with the Hausa and Yoruba for the 1951 to the 1958
period. By 1959, when Federal elections were held, the North dominated the
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congressional and ministerial positiOnS. Ihc Northern popttlation caine to play a role as
per capita representation gave the North half of the congressional seats and ministerial
positions ft)r the period 1959 to 1966. By 1966, the North had 10 and West 8, while East
had 3 and Mid-West 1 federal cabinet position.
Table 8: Composition of the Federal Cabinet,
Number of Ministers by Region and ethnic Origin, 1967-1979
1967- 1971- 1974- 1975- 1978-
Regional/ethnic unit 1970 1973 1975 1976 1977 1979
Northern Nigeria
All Ministers 9 7 10 11 10 8
Hausa-Fulani 5 4 7 9 8 6
Minorities 4 3 3 2 2 2
Eastern Nigeria
All Ministers 2 4 4 6 5 7
Igbo Ministers - 1 1 2 2 2
Minorities 2 3 3 4 3 5
Western Nigeria
Yoruba 4 5 8 9 8 4
Mid-western
Minorities 1 2 2 1 2 1
Total 16 18 24 27 25 20
Source: Adapted from Osaghae(1989:158).
Table 8 depicts the 1967-1979 composition of the Federal cabinet. The January
1966 coup and counter coup of July 1966 left General Yakubu Gowon in power. In an
effort to dislodge the country from the ethno regional and religious rift, Gowon created
twelve states out of the original four regions. The composition of the Federal cabinet
changed dramatically with the Gowon regime. With Gowon’ s 1967 state creation, the
number of Northern minorities in cabinet positions increased. By 1976 state creation, the
number of Northern minorities in cabinet positions decreased from 1967-1970 of 4 (25%)
to 2 in the 1976-1979. The West had good ministerial representation of 25%-35% for
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1967-1979 periods. The North had a decent number of ministers for the 1967—1979 eras.
The West had higher numbers of ministers than any other group in the 1973 and 1975.
The Northern I lausa-Fulani and Yoruba west had equal number of cabinet positions for
the 1976 and 1977 period. Ibos had no cabinet representation during the war years of
1967-1970 when they were trying to secede. The number of Ibo representation remained
low for the 1976 period. Since states were major criteria for gaining those positions, Ibos
were at a disadvantage with oniy two states while the west had four states. There was no
state creation for the 1979-1983 period of civilian rule under President Shehu Shagari.
The North however dominated this era in terms of ministerial and congressional
representation through gains from a large number of states and population. The Northern
minorities were adequately represented in this period also. The Ibos and Mid-West
minorities fared worse than the North in the 1979-1983 period and in the earlier period of
1961-1983.
The regimes that came after the 1979-1983 civilian administration were the
Buhari’s (1983-1985), Babangida (1985-1993), and Abacha (1993-1998). There were
three state creation exercises from 1987-1996. According to Mustapha, the increasing
arbitrariness of the administrations of Buhari, Babangida and Abacha and their alienation
of southerners fueled ethnic tensions.23 The Buhari administration (1983-1985) arbitrarily
dispensed the ministerial positions: the Northwest had (6, 30%) while the Southwest and
North-central had (4, 20%) cabinet positions. The Southeast, South-south and Northeast
were underrepresented with (2, 10%) each zone. During the 1986 period when states
23 Mustapha, ‘Ethnic Structure,” 19.
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were created by Bahangida’s administration, Northwest, North—central and Southwest had
(5. 22.7%), Southeast and Northeast had the least number of (2, 9.1%), and South-south
had (3, 13.6%). By the 1991, state creation era, the Northwest had (6, 33.3%), Northeast,
Southeast and Southwest had (3,16.7%) while North-central (2, 11.1%); and South-South
(1, 5.5%).
The Ibo agitation and complaint of marginalization helped the group gain two
additional states. With four states they were able to get 3(16.7%) of the cabinet positions.
The South-South and North-Central cabinet positions were drastically reduced during the
1991 period. The only thing consistent from 1987-1996 periods is that the Northwest and
South-west were adequately represented. The Southeast was consistently and
inadequately represented. The Northeast seemed to be inadequately represented for the
1983-1987 period while the North-Central was adequately represented. The North has
been overrepresented as a group throughout the various periods. The 1996 state creation
had the cabinet positions more evenly distributed except for the Ibos with the only single
digit number or 9.1 percent. By the last state creation in 1996, the rationale that creating
states would alleviate ethnic strife was not fully realized.
A powerful argument can be made that the creation of states in Nigeria has not
benefited the country, and in some ways, has hindered nation building and exacerbated
differences among groups of Nigerians. The efforts to create states succeeded only in
resurrecting two monstrosities that have been thorns in Nigeri&s flesh. The bigger
monster is a federal government, a powerful and controlling unit that wields selfish
influence and willfully neglects ordinary Nigerians. The smaller monsters are the states
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which incessantly clamor br recognition, arc poorly organized, and have jurisdictions
that are no bigger than the cities of Forest Park or Riverdale, Georgia. The federal
government controls the nation’s purse and gives resources to states that dance to her
tune and starve those who resist her encroachments.
Efforts to create states in Nigeria failed from the onset for obvious reasons. First,
there was no consensus; there was not enough field study to determine the feasibility of
creating states; and there was little evidence that ordinary Nigerians had opportunities to
fully participate in discussions that precede the exercise. Secondly, there was little or no
discussion concerning how state creation would affect the three major groups (Ibos,
Yorubas, and Hausa-Fulani) and the roles they would play. Thirdly, boundaries between
states were hastily drawn resulting in chaos as family members are separated or
segregated into different states. In the Nigerian scene, power resides with the federal
government; the states have no rights and are simply inconsequential appendages.
State creation in Nigeria was started and perpetuated by the military. With
exception of the 1963 creation of the Midwest, the military created all states in Nigeria.
The military by nature is inclined to a hierarchical nature of administration and brought
such practice to federal-state relations. The military governments assigned soldiers to
most governmental agencies and civilian policy input was minimal. When civilians are
appointed to make policies, the military simply ignores those that do not serve their
purpose. States as a result were created with no objectives in mind other than to
haphazardly solve a problem (such as to counter a coup) or to get the complaints off their
91
l)acks (such as a religious group claiming it is being oppressed). The old military
mentality still pervades and is controlling the politics of state creation in Nigeria.
The biggest obstacle to the success of the new states seems to deal with
distribution of wealth. There appears to be inadequate discussion regarding sources of
revenue to carry out the states’ governmental functions. The federal government seems to
favor Northern states whose coffers overflow, while it practices benign neglect of
southern states whose budgets are inadequate to meet the needs of the citizens. The
Southern oil producing states where a large portion of Nigerian revenue is generated
continue to receive negligible revenue from oil like the other Southern states. These oil
producing states are left with communities’ devastated by oil spill and gas-flaring. The
voices of dissent from oil producing communities are quickly met with brutal federal
force, imprisonment or massacre. Both the federal and state politicians/leaders are
corrupt; stealing and carting money away to foreign banks is the order of the day.
Nigerians run for political offices to amass wealth. Serving the people or seeing to the
needs of ordinary citizens is not valued.
Religious strife is another issue that state creation has not resolved. Nigeria has a
population estimated to be 140 million people. Nigerians fall into as many as 370 ethnic
groupings with distinct languages, religious observances, and cultural backgrounds.
Nigeria is a nation whose inhabitants practice different religions. The three major
religions in Nigeria are Islam, Christianity, and traditional religion. Each of the three
major religions has different sects. Not all Muslims are of the same Islamic sect.
Christians include the Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, and Seventh Day Adventists, to
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mention only a few. T’raditional religion can include ancestor worship and Atheism.
While diverse religious prelerences can be instruments for national unity if utilized
wisely, they sometimes lead to strife created by religious intolerance.
Religious differences seem to be more pronounced as more states are created. It
appears that persons practicing different religions dominate certain states. In the Northern
states, Islam is the predominant religion, and Christianity flourishes predominantly in the
Southern states. Islam and Christianity, for example, have different holidays and religious
observances which they expect fellow citizens to respect. Violence often erupts when
religious observances are not respected, or where Jesus or Mohammad is insulted.
Bienen acknowledges that religion has been an element in the conflict between ethno
linguistic groups in Nigeria. He goes further to state that “since the creation of 12 states
in 1967 and 19 states in 1976, it became necessary for Northern leaders to stress Islam in
order to maintain Northern unity.”24
The religious dichotomy was intensified and highlighted in the 1979 Draft
Constitution fight over Sharia. Sharia is the Islamic laws consisting of customary and
penal codes. The 1979 Nigerian Draft Constitution Committee agreed to limit having
Sharia Court of Appeals only at the state level without the penal code.2 The Sharia issues
were muted in 1979 when the pro-Sharia members of the Constitution Drafting
Committee walked out in protest of the aforementioned agreement on Sharia.
24 Henry Bienen, “Religion, Legitimacy, and Conflict in Nigeria,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 483 (Jan., 1986): 50.
“ Kristen Walles, Brief Histoty of Islam in Nigeria, in Nigeria in i/ic Twentieth Century, ed. ToWn
Falola. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 656.
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The enlistment of Nigeria into Organization o1 Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986
was another factor that raised the ethno—religious tensions in Nigeria. The religious
porizution prompted Abiola, a prominent Yoruba Muslim, to call for the re
interpretation of ‘federal character’ in religious terms in 1988, a year after the 1987 state
creation was done. The current view is that ethno-regional criteria should not be the only
determining factor in the distribution of revenue and federal jobs. More appropriate
factors should include needs, and the willingness to correct past injustice. Ambassador
Jolly Tanko YusuI of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) made a plea for equity in
the appointment of federal ministers. The Christians accused Babangida’s administration
of displacing Christians when he replaced Chief of Army Staff, Ebitu Ukiwe and Foreign
Minister Bolaji Akinyemi. By 1990, Christian organizations staged street demonstrations
in some of the major cities to protest the new federal cabinet that appeared to favor
Muslims. Muslims also criticized the government for Christian dominated leadership of
various transition agencies, including the Political Bureau, the National Electoral
Commission (NEC), Constituent Assembly and Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance.
The religious strife is not limited to Christian versus Muslims or Traditional
versus the Christians and Muslims. Religious strife includes also fighting between sects,
or radical reformers versus conservative religious sects. The north provides an example
of such religious infighting. The Emirs are considered spiritual and traditional leaders of
the north and as such are consulted with by the political leadership. The creation of states
created new opportunities for more radical leadership at the gubernatorial level. These
26 Suberu. “Ethnic Conflict,” 133.
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young radical governors 1)tIShC(l br changes that were disliked by the conservative
Muslim communities of states like Kaduna and Kano. Governors of the new states of
Kaduna and Kano were not showing the expected acquiescence to the traditional/spiritual
leadership of their Etnirs.
In 19X1, riots broke out in Kano state after Governor Rimi, accused the Ernir of
disrespecting the secular authority.27 Consequentially, Governor Rimi’ s special assistant
was killed during the rioting. With the creation of 19 states in 1976, the influx into the
capital cities of Kano and Kaduna by wandering Muslim students increased. The
wandering students were once accorded respect but were now seen as threatening by the
privileged groups. The increasing look down of the wandering Muslim students by the
new state elite, created resentment but also an opportunity for Muhammudu Marwa
Maitatsine (a radical cleric) to recruit followers to his radical Islamic group. Maitatsine
was out to root out materialism, privilege and purify Islamic practices.28 Maitatsine riots
claimed the lives of about 10,000 Nigerians before being quenched by the Army and
Police. The problem with such riots is that once other groups like the Ibos or Yoruba’s
are targeted in the north, the southerners seek revenge on innocent northerners in the
south. The vendetta and its perpetual continuity are tragic for a country like Nigeria.
State creation did not stop religious strife in Nigeria. Religious strife actually
intensified after the last state creation of 1996. Religious strife continued into year 2000.
The 1999 enactment of strict Sharia laws in Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Kaduna, Kastina,




those slates to unimaginable lcvcI. The Christians within those states and those all over
Nigeria were troubled by this wave of Islamization of Nigeria. Up until 1999, oniy civil
Sharia laws were implemented. However, in 1999, the penal code of the Sharia was
implemented.3°The adoption of the Penal code of Sharia in Zamfara was peaceful.
Kaduna state adoption of Sharia was met by riots from the southern minorities of
Kaduna. Hundreds of lives were lost as a result of the Kaduna riots. Unfortunately, the
states of Sokoto, Kano, Katsitna, Bauchi, Niger, Gombe, Jigawa, Kebbi, and Yobe, also
experienced riots over establishment of Sharia legal system. The killing of Eastern
Christians was retaliated in the Eastern towns of Owerri, Aba, Umuahia, Okigwe, and
Uyo.3’
hi addition to the ethno-uegional and religious factors that threaten nation
building, inter-state and communal conflict continues to decimate the nation building
project. The 1967 state creation exercise opened deep wounds between East-Central and
Rivers State as Ibo properties were seized as ‘abandoned property’ during the war years
(1967-1970) without adequate compensation to the Ibos. As states were created, new
minority and majority formations emerged. According to Mustapha, there were new
states with two or three dominant ethnic formations over other minorities. The dominant
groups were locked in a struggle of supremacy and violence often erupted.32 For
example, Kogi state had tn-ethnic struggle for dominance. The Ebira, Igala, and Yoruba
are the dominant groups in Kogi state and live alongside some smaller minorities.





‘l’lie conflict among the three major groups overshadows the concerns and
interests of the smaller groups. In states like Benue, one group dominates the other. The
Tiv dominate the Idornas and insist that five Tiv sections must rule as Governors of the
state before the Idomas. Intrastate conflicts come not only from distinct groups but also
from within hotnogenous groups. Babawale is of the opinion that military leaders’
desperation for legitimacy compelled them to arbitrarily cite local government
headquarters, thereby igniting old animosities, militant groups, and intra-ethnic
violence.33 lie versus Modakeke (Osun State) and Ijaw versus Itsekiri (Delta State) are
examples of such military administrative arbitrariness that resulted to intra-ethnic
violence. A communal conflict of Aguleri versus Umuleri is an example of communal
land dispute exacerbated by state creation in Anambra where land is scarce. Premium on
scarce land exerts too much pressure on communities and often ignites old disputes as in
Anambra.
Drawbacks of State Creation Rationales
Rationales for state creation present some drawbacks with regard to
centralization, viability, and ethno-regional impasse impeding constitutional changes.
These drawbacks are thresholds that must be resolved so that the rationales of national
unity, nation building, and national progress can be attained.
Centralization is a consequential outcome of military creation of states from
1967-1996 (with the exception of the civilian rule from 1979-1983). The military
Tunde Babawale. The Challenges ojNatioiihood, in Twentieth Century iVigeria. ed. Toy in
Falola. (Durham. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. 2002), 379.
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I iciaiuhical ten(lency is then iInl)ose(I oil the Iederal structure when i lie SU1)tciIie Military
‘oiiiicil ( r Anned lorces Revolutionary (otLilcil hecoiiies [lie central legislative and
executive hotly. Ike 1964 regions were powertul but with each state creation, the states
lost inure power to the center. By the time there were 36 states, some states were smaller
than a inalor city. With diminished population and political power, these states served
merely as administrative appendages of the center. The center started extracting
concurrent power from the states and designated those powers as exclusive powers to the
center. Those matters previously on the concurrent list of federal-state jurisdiction
include the police, elections, constitutions, arms, prisons, bankruptcy, roads, industrial
relations and topographical surveys. The regions enjoyed these powers in the First
Republic ([963-1966) but lost them by the Second Republic. Powers of the state were
relatively diminished by the [967 exercise but states were still strong. Beginning with the
1976 state creation exercise onwards, state powers were continually being eroded with
each subsequent exercise.
The over-centralizing influence of the center is not only political but also fiscal.
The economic drawback of state creation is the lack of economic viability of the
federating units called states. The states lack autonomous economic resources necessary
to resist domination and marginalization from the center. More important is the equitable
resource distribution and independent economic endeavor for development of various
states. The revenue sharing continues to be a challenge as the oil-hearing states of Delta
are not satisfied with 13 percent derivation which they deem inadequate to resolve the
environmental issues of oil exploration. Tam David West, a former Petroleum Minister
horn Rivers State, proposed that 2() percent was a niore acceptable (lerivation criteria.
Ihe late ( )goni Mitiority Activist, Ken Saro—Wiwa, (also lroiii Rivers state) felt that tue
oil-hearing states SlioLild retain 5() percent derivation from oil.
[he manipulation ot region and religion Continues to irnpe(Ie constitutional
reforms. ( )ncc states are created and new majority/minority lormations are established, it
hecomes almost impossible to make constitutional changes, to redraw boundaries, merge
states, or strengthen the states. Constitutional drafting committees have always been
encumbered by religious and regional manipulations. Except for the [963 creation of the
Mid-West, no state creation has been successfully done in a civilian administration. The
North is weary of a National Sovereign Conference. Such a conference, if successful, will
dilute Northern political power, give higher derivation to the Niger Delta, or may even
mean dissolution of Nigeria as we know it. Nigeria is a deeply divided country where
region and religious loyalties supersede nation building. The Christians and Muslims
contest for the number of states, ministerial positions, and over whether Nigeria should
join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and have Sharia courts. These
contests and conflicts speak to the division along regional and ethnic lines.
The situation in Nigeria from 1960 to 2000 was such that there were legitimate
concerns about nation building and maintaining unity among various ethnic groups and
religious, and improving intergovernmental and iritragovernmental relations. It appears
the situation would have improved through the use of decentralization, economic viability
and non-constitutional changes.
“Suberu, “Ethnic Contlict,” 1fl.
Si iheru was of the view hat “process of hyper—centralizal ion’’ in Nigeria started
\V it Ii the Inst phase ot ml! itary nile twin I 966— 1979 and was siihseqticntly perpetuated
:111(1 eX(Ctl(le(l inider the second phase ol military rule I 984— n ‘E’he military
hierarchical nature was incrementally imposed on the federal structure thereby weakening
the states through its centralizing influences. Decentralization must be part of the solution
in giving the states and localities the political independence to manage their affairs
without constant intervention From the center. Political viability must mean that states
must have residual powers over education, basic health services and housing. Some of the
pre-inilitary rule, concurrent functions like police, constitution, and traffic on federal
roads must he re-established.
‘[he residual and concurrent functions desired by states for political viability
included their development of independent resources for economic viability. Without
economic viability, states cannot effectively administer some of the functions they desire.
There has to be a reversal of federal claim to all economic resources. Since it is virtually
impossible to loosen the exclusive federal grip on oil rents, asking for a more equitable
distribution of oil revenue seems to be more practical. Exclusive federal management of
the Marketing Boards and Finance equally retards the state from any real economic
independence. Having independent economic bases (Marketing Boards and Finance) will
enable the states to resist federal intrusion, marginalization and domination. It is this lack
of emphasis at the state and local levels that is deterring economic development in
Nigeria. Schools, hospitals. and markets are built by communities, yet these communities
Ibid.. 173.
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tie hot IHVOIVC(l in making (lecisions affecting them. If states can take tip Commerce and
i itance I iivolv lug Marketing Hoards and extensive microfinance at the local level,
iiI(lepeildeilt income generation will increase at the local level and jobs will be created.
Micro financing in the past has tailed to alleviate poverty due to the top—down
approach to implementing those programs and as a result, the poor are inadequately
reached. When community projects involve local people directly in their localities, they
tend to respond better and account better at their local areas. A Nigerian will be less
willing to rip—otf his clansmen but more willing to rip-off the government which they see
as alien or white people’s work. Knowing this only raises the question why the
government has not tried a more localized community approach to micro [Thance.
Finally, is the issue of constitutional impasse for the changes needed to have a
robust federal system respecting of state and local authorities. This inability to make
constitutional changes is evident in the 1999 civilian government imposition of the
revised 1979 Constitution. Ethno-regional impasse has made it impossible to make
constitutional changes necessary for nation building. The country mtLst then concentrate
on less tension-laden options for nation building. There has to be an independent and
stable oversight for elections, anti-corniption, and an independent Supreme Court. It is
these oversights and checks on the executive branch that will create a sanitized
environment conducive for nation building. En other words, this idea of non-constitutional
measures will only serve as a precursor to dealing with the hard issues of zoning, revenue
sharing and state internal income generation.
I () I
lssi.tes of zoning have been coming up since the [)79 Presidential hiections where
leadership proposed a rOtHtH)Iuhl )reSidCIiCy l)flSC(l OH zones. Ironi I 79 to the Abacha
iiiilitary regime of I Y93— 1996, zoning became an ISStLC in the Nigeria polity. Ahacha and
Southern leadership like Enahoro and Ekwucrne, are in support of the six zone strncture.
[he Northerners are mostly weary of these ZOHC5 as constitutionally entrenched
coIlte(leration that will ultimately split the country. The Northern fear may be more tied
to their unwillingness to share power they confidently control by their gift of bigger
population, size and ability to garner cohesion through [slam for domination of the
center. It is this psychological factor that is restraining Nigerians from making decisions
about the structure of their country. Questions remain as to whether the 36 states are too
many; or whether the six zones will resolve all boundary and ethnic issues. What is clear
is the fact that zones are being used in various academic and political exercises in
Nigeria. Academics use it for analysis. Population/Census use zonal data to track trends
in various zones. Zoning is helping the weakened states to garner political and economic
power needed for development but not without the center’s resistance.
Advantages of State Creation
Despite the disadvantages of proliferation of states in Nigeria, there are some
advantages from state creation exercise. The advantages of the state creation exercise
include federal character application to states, tinity, and Distributive Pool allocation to
states. The federal character was introduced in 1979 and used to reflect the federal
character or representation of the states through appointment of each state to a ministerial
position, bureaucratic jobs and government corporations and the army. To he elected the
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)IeS1(l(Iit the uaIi(h(late must ol)talml at least a quarter of the Votes Il each of or two—thirds
the states. lIme equality of states princil)le also gtiides how fifty perCeilt o[ collected oil
evemie is shared equally amnomlgst the states. ‘[‘he unity garnered from state creation rests
on the idea (hat Nigeria isa united nation of thirty—six states rather a conglomerate of
warring trihal factions. [‘he central government is strong and has the ability to subdue
ethnic and regional conflict and br seceding tendencies from these smaller states.
We could not say that of the regions where central government was constantly threatened
and abortive secession attempts rampart.
(L IAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUS I( )NS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS
RESEARCH FINDIN(;S
State creation has Iaile(1 in many ways to holster good governance, stimulate
nation building and strengthen national progress. If good governance includes
maintaining a fragile nation-state, state creation has done that. However, state creation
has been instrumental in plunging the country into civil war in 1967. When centralization
is added to the political equation, state creation becomes an impediment since it hyper
centralizes the federal system. State and local powers are usurped and power that is
supposed to be nearer to the people at the bottom is now at the top. Services and
programs are micro-managed from the center. State creation rationale of rapid economic
development’ has not been realized. States are economically non-viable and are totally
dependent on the center. There is no serious effort to encourage the states to seek internal
income generation.
The states get an inadequate 10 percent of their federal funding specifically for
internal income generation. The Federal Government, on the other hand, monopolizes
resources and lucrative oil rents without serious efforts to encourage state economic
independence. There has been a lack of emphasis on micro-financing to alleviate poverty
and rural infrastructure to improve the general wellbeing of the people. It is the position
of this study that state creation has failed to bring about cultural stability due to its
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I ( )
Is I{laI)IliIy to elk! etlul() •regioiial ;Llk! religious stole. Ilie oloiiiiiiatit glOLlj)S struggle br
onhlInItluc has tesiolted to the creation of II ni the states as majority states while 14
states are iii the inilu)rity hands. M iliority states have other minority kriuations being
iiargiiialized by the new minority majority lormations. Strife continues at the regional,
religious and the minority state levels.
Con ci us ion
Ilie colonial legacies of divide and rule continue to impede the good governance,
national progress and nation building in Nigeria. Nigeria leadership learned this “divide
and rule” tactic too well and seem to have out done the British by incessantly creating
states that have failed to provide the necessary good governance and constitutional
safeguards that guarantees minority rights, [naps interstate cooperation, national and sub
national relations. Creating states without these safeguards have rendered state creation
ineffective and the rationales for creating them not met.
It appears that good governance has not been bolstered by state creation since the
central government has disrupted interstate cooperative efforts that will strengthen
provision of personnel and services between the states and within states. More
importantly is the fact that with fewer states, there will emerge more resources to provide
better services for the people of the states. The states are at a disadvantage when it comes
to vertical power relations. This disadvantage emanates from centralizing influence of the
center. The state creations from 1967 to 1996 were done under the military and as such
the military subjected the states to military hierarchy. The states were not only subjected
to the third tier governmental policy body but their functions have been extracted by the
national government. The residual powers over primary education, basic health, and
I(h
lIuILSllfl have bec.n cxiractcd by Ike center. Ike stales eiijoy IflOft Iesklual powers under
civil jail adininistral lulls and could ehalletige the ceiitcr ill court over jurisdictional
natters. I)eniocralic setting lhcii becomes a perqtlislte atlnosl)here where states can
exercise their residual powers ot edt.ication, liealthcare, housing, and wider fiscal Freedom
of iuiidiiig programs. Constitutionil silegttaids should be implemented to protect states
rum centralizing iiilluence of the center. It is this constitutional sateguard that will
cqiially protect groups within states from discrimination in jobs and services.
When we examine the activities of various regimes that created Nigerian states, it
appears that state creation failed to maintain political stability. Political instability
plagued several state-creating regimes. The Tafewa Balewa administration (1960-1966),
the Ironsi administration (January 1966-July, 1966), Gowon Administration (1966-1975),
the MohamrriedlObasarijo administration (1975-1979), experienced one crises or the
other. The Gowon administration creation of states summarily triggered a civil war that
was fought for three years. Unity with diversity has not been practiced by a hierarchical
military leadership whose attempt at subjugation of the states creates political tremors in
the country. It continues to manifest that Nigeria’s problem cannot be resolved by states
but by how the units arc treated in their relations to the center which translates into how
they treat the localities and people. It is safe to state that the creation of Nigeria’s states
under many regimes was a bane rather than a blessing as political instability continues to
be the order of the day.
State creation has failed to promote rapid economic development. Nigeria is a
nation much of whose population falls below the poverty line, literacy rate is very low,
and most Nigerians earn less than one dollar a day. Few Nigerian families can afford
lceciit iOiISli1i, iili’titiaLc L(liiCHtk)I1 for ihcir (_lIil(lren, Of basic health care.
I iieliipl()yiHciit is hiichi cviii aiiioiig college c(lucated N u.crians, (IrcainS of self—
ciuployinent aie iii itigated by iIIa(lequate resources or 111)11-exist mg financial counsel ing.
States are often created with no thoughts given to how they would obtain resources to
build necessary infrastructures or provide inutidanc services, such as the building of
chools, markets, hospitals, and post offices. As inflation rises and the value of Naira falls
($1 equals 145 Naira), the average Nigerian cannot meet basic needs. Economic
development in Nigeria appears to be at a standstill because poor, voiceless Nigerians
Continue to he inarginalized while the central government benefits the elites and the states
benefit the majority ethnic groups. Thus, state creation has failed to meet developmental
needs of the states and the citizens who reside in them.
State creation has also failed to prevent ethnic strife and religious tensions in
Nigeria. State creation has not prevented ethnic conflict in Nigeria when we consider
frequent ethnic hostilities taking place among [bos and Yorubas in Lagos State where Ibo
property has been seized, markets burned, and thousands of citizens forced to flee for
their lives. There have been frequent burnings of churches and mosques among
Christians and Muslims in Kaduna State. Brutal massacres of Ibos have been reported in
Northern Nigeria as well as slaughtering of human beings among Christians and Mulims
in Plateau State. Consider prevailing religious intolerance that takes place in Nigeria as a
whole, and the application of Sharia law in several Muslim-dominated states. The
situation was rendered more absurd when Babangida single-handedly and without
consultations, signed Nigeria into membership in Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC) much to the dismay of many Christians and non-Muslim religious groups. [here
‘U!
i:iiiiiut l)C i(’licl lmiii e111I1OreliLiOI1S aIi(l reLioiial st(ual)l)lcs without robust coiisti[utioiial
iie ZiLaI(IS ii1(l civil right (liViSk)flS to guarantee state and iIIdiVi(lual rights. Nigeria must
revisit its state resideiicy amid “mndigene—settler’ )oIiciC5 lIi(l elicotirage pre—cok)nial
accel)tance ot groIL)s within the area they havc migrated. Ethnic and regional
ap[)rehellSioils would continue if ethnic distinctions are not diluted.
)n the strength ot the toregoing statements, it is safe to argue that political
sIal)ility, economic progress and good governance can he achieved by measures other
than just state creation. Nigeria would benefit from developing a crop of quality grass
root leaders who have the interests of their people at heart, who do not go into politics for
personal enrichment or self-aggrandizement, and who are committed to the
empowerment of each citizen.
Recommendations for Future Study
Future research should be designed to expand the contributions of this study to the
field of International Affairs and Development. Future study on Nigeria State Creation
Rationales should include an in-depth study of intergovernmental relations, and interview
of major actors of state creation to ascertain their current views on state creation. The
views of state creation actors and stakeholders may have changed and a primary study of
these groups in Nigeria would further inform this discourse.
There has to also be a study of the constitutional issues of minority rights. These
efforts can help craft legislations which if implemented can better serve the minorities
population of Nigeria. Equally important is why region and religion keeps impeding
constitutional reform. There has to be a study ascertaining if Nigerians prefer non-
ii)IlsLIIIIIk)Ilal I)lsrll)I1o1s ni s1iiigthciiiiig (lie le(lctIl syslciii. l’his study only touched
Oil Liclois that illlj)e(lC cOulsIItIitK)iial cliaiiges to a! lect a roluist lederal system.
liiiall y. t lucre are cultural iiill)C(liiTleiitS where Nuieriaiis ale reluctant to discuss
hailures oh their states, and ethnic cOiflJlitiilities br tear oh ostracization. [his study had
difficulties getting policy makers to discuss policy failures or perceptions. Therefore,
further research is needed to reduce reluctance of policy makers in sharing data br
academic research concerning state creation.
( )()
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